Statutory Reaction to Revenue Procedure 64-19 by Johnson, Hervey McNair
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 46 | Number 3 Article 4
4-1-1968
Statutory Reaction to Revenue Procedure 64-19
Hervey McNair Johnson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hervey M. Johnson, Statutory Reaction to Revenue Procedure 64-19, 46 N.C. L. Rev. 531 (1968).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol46/iss3/4
STATUTORY REACTION TO REVENUE
PROCEDURE 64-19
HERvE Y McNAIR JOHNSONt
INTRODUCTION
Many view the federal estate tax marital deduction- as the most
significant deduction in federal estate tax law.2 Since its enactment
twenty years ago,3 lawyers and laymen alike have contrived nu-
merous approaches to achieve either a specified marital deduction
or the maximum marital deduction.4 Of the various techniques de-
t A.B. 1964, Princeton University; LL.B. 1967, Duke University; Mem-
ber of the North Carolina Bar and Law Faculty at University of Melbourne.
'The federal estate tax marital deduction allows the estate of the de-
cedent-either husband or wife-a deduction of ap to one-half of the de-
cedent's adjusted gross estate for "the value of any interest in property which
passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to
the extent that such interest is included in determining the value of the gross
estate." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2056(a), (c) (1). The concept "adjusted
gross estate" was created exclusively for use in computing the 50 percent
ceiling of the marital deduction. S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 18-19 (1948). Assuming no community property is involved, the de-
cedent's adjusted gross estate is "computed by subtracting from the entire
value of the gross estate the aggregate amount of the deductions [expenses,
indebtedness, taxes and losses] allowed by sections 2053 and 2054." INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 2056(c) (2) (A). For examples of computations, see
Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(c)-1(b), (c)-2(a)-(j) (1962).
2 Fleming, Five Years' Experience With the Marital Deduction, 34 CHI.
B. RECORD 247 (1953); Kohn, The Marital Deduction: When and How to
Use It, 16 W. REs. L. REV. 237 (1965); Note, 43 N.C.L. REV. 459, 460
(1965). See 2 FED. EST. & GiFr TAX REP. 7155 for an illustrative chart of
the savings that might be realized by utilizing the marital deduction. For a list
of authorities where many aspects of the marital deduction are discussed, see
J. TRACHTMAN, ESTATE PLANNING 15 n.6 (1965).
' Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 361, 62 Stat. 117, amending INT. REV.
CODE Of 1939, ch. 3, § 812, 53 Stat. 123 (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
2056). See geterally Casner, Estate Planning Under the Revenue Act of
194$, 62 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1949); McLucas, Marital Deduction for
Estate Taxes, 86 TRuSTs & ESTATES 445 (1948); Surrey, Federal Taxation
of the Family--The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1948).
The provision for the federal estate tax marital deduction was enacted
in 1948 with a view toward equalizing the estate tax benefits and burdens
available to married residents of common law and community property
states. See, J. FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 274-76 (3d ed. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as FARR]; C. LOWNDES & R. KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXES 368-70 (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as LOWNDES &
KRAMER].
'See A.J. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 790-97 (3d ed. 1961), 638-49
(Supp. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CASNER]; FARR 289-303; R. WORMSER,
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veloped-both formula and non-formula bequests and transfers in
trust (hereinafter referred to as bequests) P-this article will deal
with the pecuniary interest bequest in light of problems created by
the promulgation of Revenue Procedure 64-19.o A brief presenta-
tion of the evolution of the pecuniary interest bequest 7 -the first
formula bequest developed--should provide the background neces-
sary for a meaningful appreciation of Revenue Procedure 64-19.
Evolution of Pecuniary Interest Formula
Draftsmen realized early that to achieve the maximum marital
deduction, the instrument should provide for a dollar amount, equal
THE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES 15-24, 258-66 (2d ed.
1966).
' The controversy over the merits of non-formulae bequests vis-A-vis the
merits of the formulae bequests remains a viable one. See, e.g., J. TRACHT-
MAN, supra note 2, at 40-55; R. WORMSER, supra note 4, at 263-64; Cox,
Types of Marital Deduction Formula Clauses, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 909, 915-26 (1957); Craven, Marital Deduction Problems: Use of the
Percentage Formula Clause, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 613, 617-21
(1961); Durand, Draftsmanship: Wills and Trusts, 96 TRUSTS & ESTATES
871, 872-74 (1957); Sargent, Drafting of Wills and Estate Planning, 43
B.U.L. REV. 179 (1963); Trachman, Marital Deduction-Use of Non-
Formula Provisions, N.Y.U. 19THl INST. ON FED. TAX. 631 (1961).
Of the various formulae bequests used by lawyers and accountants, many
are complicated, and the comparative merits of each have been and are the
subject of continuing debate. See, e.g., R. COVEY, THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
AND THE USE OF FORMULA PROVISIONS (1966); Casner, Estate Planning-
Marital Deduction Provisions of Trusts, 64 HARv. L. REV. 582 (1951);
Casner, How to Use Fractional Share Marital Deduction Gifts, 99 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 190 (1960); Durbin, Marital Deduction Formula Revisited:
Numerator-Deiwminator Approach as Solution to Current Problems, 102
TRUSTS & ESTATES 545 (1963); Edwards, Marital Deduction Formulae-
A Planner's Guide, 1967 DUKE L.J. 254 [hereinafter cited as Edwards];
Fleming, supra note 2; Golden, Rev. Proc. 64-19: Implications for Attorneys
and Fiduciaries, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 536 (1964); McGorry, Pecuniary
or Fractional Formula, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES 422 (1959); Polasky, Marital
Deduction Fornuda Clauses in Estate Planning-Estate and Income Tax
Considerations, 63 Micir. L. REV. 809 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Polasky].
'Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 682.
rFor discussions of the historical development of the pecuniary interest
formulae, see generally Edwards 255-57; Gradwohl, "Vesting" Under
Marital Deduction, Revenue Procedure 64-19 and Handling Pre-October 1,
1964, Disposition, 45 NEB. L. REV. 441, 441-44 (1966); Lloyd, Revenue Pro-
cedure 64-19: Background of Drafting Problems, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES
898, 898-99 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Lloyd]. For a good example of a
will using the pecuniary interest formula, see Report of Subcommittee on
Forms for Marital Deduction Planning, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 961, 962-64
(1964).
For examples of some earlier types of pecuniary interests formulae, see
CASNFER 793-94; Casner, How To Use Fractional Share Marital Deduction
Gifts, 99 TRUSTS & ESTATES 190 & n.1 (1960).
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to one-half of the decedent's adjusted gross estate, which amount
will include the value of property qualifying for the marital deduc-
tion and passing to the surviving spouse both under and outside
the instrument.9 A provision was added which allowed the executor
to satisfy the maximum marital deduction by distributions in kind
as well as in cash.' Absent the allowance for in-kind distributions,"
the estate would probably suffer not only expenses and frequently
substantial losses accompanying the disposal of the assets to obtain
the required amount of cash,'" but also the income taxes that would
result from dispositions of appreciated assets.13 Furthermore, the
'See LOWNDES & KRAMER 370-71; Wright, The Marital Deduction
Since Revenue Procedure 64-19, 106 TRUSTS & ESTATES 101 (1967); Treas.
Reg. § 20.2056(c)-i (b) (1962). This early phraseology of the pecuniary
interest formula was occasioned partially by the Internal Revenue Service's
description of the marital deduction as "an amount equal to" the value of
property which ultimately passed to the surviving spouse. INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 2056(a). See Lauritzen, The Marital Deductions, 103 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 318 (1964); Waters, Saving the Marital Deduction From the Rev.
Proc. 64-19 Trap, 19 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 359, 366 (1965).
"oSee FARR 294; Lloyd 898. For a discussion of some of the difficulties
confronting an executor who is empowered to make distributions in kind,
see Rodman, Executors Power to Allocate Property to Qualify for the
Marital Deduction, 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES 801 (1955). Nevertheless, the
grant of this discretionary power was found to be highly desirable. One
reason was the enhanced flexibility in estate planning. As a result of this
latitude, the marital bequest could be funded with numerous combinations of
real and personal property and cash. See Sugarman, "Pecuniary Formula"
Marital Deduction Bequests: Application of Revenue Procedure 64-19, 16
W. REs. L. REv. 257, 258-59 (1965); Comment, The Marital Deduction-
Effect of Revenue Procedure 64-19, 33 TENN. L. REv. 493, 496 (1966).
" See Lloyd 898; Weinstock, The Marital Deduction-Problems and
Answers Under Revenue Procedure 64-19, 43 TAXES 340, 341-42 (1965).
2 Even if there is no directive to make distributions in cash, the problem
still remains because of the rule that, absent a provision empowering the
executor to make distributions in kind, the marital bequest must be satisfied
entirely in cash. See, In re Campbell's Will, 144 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sur. Ct.
1955); In re Lazar's Estate, 139 Misc. 261, 247 N.Y. Supp. 230 (Sur. Ct.
1930); CASNER 814.
" If an asset has appreciated in value, the estate would be subject to an
income tax on the recognized gain measured by the difference between the
basis of the asset as determined by federal estate tax values, INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 1014, and the amount realized from the disposition of the asset,
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1001. The basis of the asset as determined by
federal estate tax values will be either the fair market value at the date of de-
cedent's death, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2031, or at the alternate valuation
date, INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2032, which may be selected by the executor
within certain prescribed conditions, CASlER, 810-12; Treas. Regs. § 20.2032
(1962). For a brief discussion of some considerations involved in selecting
the alternate valuation date in terms of a hypothetical estate and one type of
pecuniary formula, see Comment, Choosing a Marital Deduction Formula
Clause, 44 MARQ. L. Rnv. 532, 535-36 (1961).
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executor usually was granted the discretion to select the non-cash
assets to fund the marital share in order to overcome the contention
that distributions must be composed of a fractional share of each
asset.' 4
Without a contrary provision in the instrument, the executor
who makes an in-kind distribution is required to value the asset by
its value as of the date of distribution.'" Since the pecuniary interest
bequest is viewed as providing the surviving spouse with a claim of
d fixed dollar amount,"' the distribution of assets will be treated as a
"sale or exchange" by the estate.1 7 Therefore, if a distributed
non-cash asset were one that had appreciated, the estate would be
subject to an income tax on the recognized gain.'8 In an attempt to
circumvent this potential income tax to the estate,' 9 executors were
" See Polasky 815; Comment, Marital Deduction Pecuniary Formula
Bequwsts: Revenue Procedure 64-19 and N. Y. Personal Property Law
§ 17-f, 30 ALBANY L. REv. 262, 264 (1966).
" King v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, Ga., 103 S.2d 689 (Fla.
1958) ; Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Reed, 229 Mass. 267, 118 N.E.
333 (1918); Estate of Gauff, 27 Misc.2d 407, 211 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sur. Ct.
1960).
1" Once the value of the adjusted gross estate is established, the fixed
dollar amount of the pecuniary interest bequest remains unaltered regardless
of any appreciation or depreciation in the value of the estate's assets. Rev.
Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 286; Rev. Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 Cum. BULL.
325; Kohn, supra note 2, at 243.
"' As a result of the "sale or exchange," the surviving spouse will take
the assets by purchase and not by inheritance, thereby acquiring each asset
with a basis equal to its fair market value at the date of distribution. Com-
missioner v. Brinckerhoff, 168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948); Kenan v. Commis-
sioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Sherman Ewing v. Commissioner, 40
B.T.A. 912 (1939); Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4(a) (3) (1961).
18 The recognized gain to the estate will be measured by the variance be-
tween the value of the asset as determined for federal estate tax purposes (the
basis of the asset to the estate, note 13 supra) and the fair market value of
the asset on the date of distribution (the basis of the asset to the surviving
spouse). Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Suisman v.
Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113 (D.C. Conn. 1935), aff'd sub nor., Suisman v.
Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 573 (1936); Note, 4 TAx L. Rxv. 372 (1949); Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1
Cum. BULL. 286; Rev. Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 325; Treas. Reg. §
1.1014-4(a) (3) (1961).
19 The possible income tax liability has lead some drafters to abandon the
pecuniary interest formula in favor of the fractional share formula. See
Durbin, supra note 5; Edwards 255; Lloyd 898-99. This latter formula
guaranteed the surviving spouse a marital bequest of a certain fractional
share of the decedent's estate which remained unaffected by any appreciation
or depreciation in the estate's assets. The distributions under the formula
were not viewed as a "sale or exchange" made in satisfaction of a definite
dollar amount claim against the estate. Consequently, no gain or loss was
realized with the attendant tax consequences. Rev. Rul. 55-117, 1955-1
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empowered to use federal estate tax valuations (date of death or al-
ternate valuation date) in valuing in-kind assets for distribution
purposes." This last innovation paved the way for great latitude in
post-mortem estate planning by allowing the utilization of de-
preciated assets for distributions in kind."
With this discretionary power, the executor has the option of
allocating the appreciated assets and the depreciated assets between
the surviving spouse and the other beneficiaries of the estate.2  As-
suming that the surviving spouse is amenable (she may have an in-
dependent source of income),23 the executor could find the marital
share with depreciated assets.24 This particular distribution scheme
would achieve many salutary results :25 (1) the estate will escape any
gain or loss on the distributions in kind because the valuations used
for distribution purposes were federal estate tax values; (2) be-
cause federal estate tax values were used for distribution purposes,
Cum. BULL. 223; Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4(a) (3) (1961); Report of Sub-
committee on Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, 102 TRuSTS &
ESTATES 934, 944-45 (1963).
"
0See Cox, supra note 5, at 930-32; Polasky 816-18, 865-67.
See FARR 294-95.
The following is illustrative of a pecuniary interest formula clause
containing all of the features noted in text
"If my wife, ... shall survive me, I devise and bequeath to ... , as
Trustee, an amount equal to one-half(/ 2 ) of the value of my adjusted
gross estate as finally determined for federal estate tax purposes, less the
aggregate amount of marital deductions, if any, allowed by reason of in-
terests in property passing or which have passed to my wife otherwise
than by the terms of this Article of my Will. My Executor shall have
full authority and discretion to satisfy said bequest in cash or in kind,
or partly in cash and partly in kind, and to select and designate, and to
convey and assign to the Trustee of said Trust Estate the cash, securities,
or other assets, including real estate or any interests therein, which
shall constitute said Trust Estate; provided, however, that in no event
shall there be included in said Trust Estate any asset or the proceeds of
any asset with respect to which a marital deduction would not be allow-
able, if so included; and provided, further, that assets applied on said
bequest in kind shall for such purposes be valued at the values thereof
finally determined for the purposes of the federal estate tax on my
estate. .. ."
Polasky 816-17.
"See Lloyd 899.
-' Unfortunately, conflicts among the executor, surviving spouse and
other beneficiaries do arise. See Edmonds, Administrative Problems under
Marital Deduction Clauses, 89 TRUsTs & ESTATES 380, 381 (1950); Kiley
& Golden, A Residue Formula As an Aid to the Executor, 90 TRUSTs &
ESTATES 824, 826 (1951) ; Williams, Avoiding Conflict of Interest in Marital
Deduction Methods, 90 TRuSTS & ESTATES 156 (1951).
2 See Colson, The Marital Deduction and Revenue Procedure 64-19, 10
PRAc. LAw, 69, 72-74 (Oct. 1964); Lloyd 899.
1968]
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a second evaluation of assets on distribution date will not be required,
thereby easing the executor's administrative burden; (3) the execu-
tor will have satisfied the marital deduction bequest for which a
credit will be given the estate; (4) the appreciated assets will have
been given to the non-marital beneficiaries who very often are chil-
dren in lower tax brackets; and (5) assuming the depreciated assets
funded the marital share do not increase in value and are not disposed
of, the surviving spouse's estate at death will be reduced, because
these assets will be valued for purposes of the second estate at their
depreciated values.2"
This last feature of the estate planning scheme allows for a
significant tax saving :27 the dollar amount by which the assets
funded the marital share have depreciated in value will escape taxa-
tion in either estate.28 Consequently, the justification of the marital
deduction, that a certain amount of assets would not be taxed to the
first estate since an equivalent amount would be added to the sur-
viving spouse's estate, clearly was being frustrated."0 It is true
that an executor might be subject to the rule that he must distribute
"'See INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 2031; Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b)
(1965) ; note 13 mpra. Moreover, if the surviving spouse dies within ten
years after the death of the predeceased spouse, the second estate may be
diminished further by the credit allowed for previously taxed property. INT.
REv. CODE of 1954, § 2013. See Bevan, The Estate Tax Credit for Property
Previously Taxed, N.Y.U. 23RD INST. ON FED. TAX. 1117 (1965).
"'A simple example of such post-mortem manipulation should suffice.
Assume that the decedent's adjusted gross estate contains two assets, A
stock and B stock, each valued at 100,000 dollars for federal estate tax pur-
poses. On the date of distribution, the A stock has appreciated in value to
150,000 dollars and the B stock has depreciated in value to 50,000 dollars.
Assume further that the surviving spouse is amenable to receiving depreci-
ated assets from the estate. With the power posited by the instrument in the
executor to satisfy the maximum marital deduction (which, under these
hypothetical facts, would be 100,000 dollars) by distributions in kind of assets
chosen by the executor using valuations determined for federal estate tax
purposes, the executor may give the appreciated A stock to the non-marital
beneficiaries and the depreciated B stock to the marital share. Assume the
B stock maintains its depreciated value and is not disposed of before death.
After starting with the decedent's adjusted gross estate of 200,000 dollars
and subtracting the 100,000 dollars taxed to the decedent's estate and the
50,000 dollars taxed to the surviving spouse's estate, 50,000 dollars com-
pletely escapes taxation in either estate.
"3 For various examples illustrating the tax savings discussed in the
text, see Golden, Rev. Proc. 64-19: Implications for Attorneys and Fiduci-
aries, 103 TpusTs & ESTATES 536, 537 (1964); Polasky, 816-18; Sugarman,
supra note 10, at 259; 43 N.C.L. REv. 459, 463 (1965).
" See Colson, supra note 25, at 73; Comment, The Marital Deduction-
Effect of Revenue Procedure 64-19, 33 TENN. L. REv. 493, 497 (1966).
[Vol. 46
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impartially the appreciated and depreciated assets of the decedent's
estate . 0 However, under the facts of the foregoing hypothetical,
who among the surviving spouse and children is going to have the
incentive to sue? No one normally, 1 and post-mortem manipulations
of this character ultimately provoked the issuance of Revenue Pro-
cedure 64-19."2
The Scope of Revenue Procedure 64-19
Although much discussion has been generated because of the
technical complexity and catastrophic nature of the Procedure,"3 its
" See, e.g., Hall v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1945); Carrier
v. Carrier, 226 N.Y. 114, 123 N.E. 135 (1919); Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401,
137 N.W. 778 (1912) ; Lauritzen, supra note 9, at 318-19.
" But see note 24 supra.
" Warnings that pecuniary bequests using federal estate tax values
might precipitate Treasury action came as early as 1951. Casner, Estate
Planning-Marital Deduction Provisions of Trusts, 64 HAIv. L. Rnv. 582,
593-97 (1951). See CASNER 815-16; Casner, A Fiduciary's Powers and the
Marital Deduction, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 247, 248 (1961). These warn-
ings and others raised serious questions about the manipulative schemes in
addition to the avoidance of tax liability by diverting depreciated assets to
the agreeable surviving spouse. If the executor were considered as having
the power to divert property away from the surviving spouse, it was strongly
argued that the marital deduction should be disallowed. See Cox, supra note
5, at 931-32; Sugarman, supra note 10, at 260; Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056
(b)-5(a)(5), -5(j) (1964). It was also suggested that the executor's
discretion might preclude a valuation of the amount of assets disposed of
by the pecuniary bequest, thereby disqualifying such assets for the marital
deduction. See CovEy, supra note 5, at 39. Furthermore, if viewed as a
power of appointment, the exercise of the power by the executor might incur
estate and gift taxes. See CASNER 814-16; Comment, Choosing a Marital
Deduction Formula Clause, 44 MARQ. L. Rnv. 532, 538 (1961). After great
anguish and a substantial amount of communication with the American Bar
Association, the Treasury issued Revenue Procedure 64-19. See Peters,
Instance of ABA-IRS Cooperation, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 908 (1964).
" See, e.g., Alexander, Revenue Procedure 64-19: The New Marital
Deduction Ride, 36 Miss. L.J. 485 (1965); Bassiouni, The Marital Deduc-
tion Rule and Revenue Procedure 64-19, 2 ILL. CONT. LEGAL ED. 89 (Oct.
1964); Cantwell, Revenue Procedure 64-19: Statutory Relief, 104 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 953 (1965) ; Covey, Statutory Panacea for 64-19f: Existing and
Proposed Remedies for Marital Deduction Problem, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES
69 (1965); Covey, The Marital Deduction: Revenue Procedure 64-19 and
Formula Provisions, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 317 (1964); Dalton, General Review
of Marital Deduction Planning, 45 NEi-. L. REv. 414 (1966); Durand,
Revenue Procedure 64-19: Planning Lessons front Marital Deduction Liti-
gation, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 943 (1965); Golden, supra note 29, Grad-
wohl, supra note 7; Hauser, Latest Developments in Taxation of Estates
and Trusts Raise New Caveats for Tax Man, 21 J. TAx. 32 (1964);
McKenney, Revenue Procedure 64-19: Drafting Suggestions for Marital
Deductions, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 961 (1965); Mullin, Revenue Pro-
cedure 64-19: Community Property Aspects, 104 TRusrS & ESTATES 957
1968]
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area of impact is relatively small.34 Various bequests are not within
the purview of the Procedure because the manipulative vehicle, pro-
vided by the pecuniary interest bequest previously discussed, is not
deemed present. It might be helpful to list these exempt bequests.
(1) The Procedure does not apply to a bequest of "specific as-
sets."35
(2) The Procedure does not apply to a bequest "of a fractional
share of the estate, under which each beneficiary shares propor-
tionately in the appreciation or depreciation in the value of assets to
the date, or dates, of distribution. ' 36 Draftsmen should be careful
(1965); Rogovin, Revenue Procedure 64-19: Administrative History, 104
TRUSTS & ESTATES 940 (1965); Rogovin, The Sound and the Fury: Official
Views on Revenue Procedure 64-19, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 432 (1965);
Smith, New Marital Deduction Rule and Post October 1, 1964 Wills, 37
Wis. B. BULL. 7 (Oct. 1964); Stevens, How to Draft Marital Deduction
Formula Clauses under Rev. Proc. 64-19, 20 J. TAx. 352 (1964); Straus,
Revenue Procedure 64-19: When Should Agreements Be Madef, 103 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 911 (1964); Voss, The Marital Deduction and Revenue Pro-
cedure 64-19, 33 J. KAN. B. Ass'eN 298 (1964); Weinstock, supra note 11,
Wright, supra note 9; Wyshak & Wyshak, Legislative Relief for Maximum
Marital Deductions and 64-19, 41 J. ST. B. CAL. 711 (1966); Comment,
Drafting Solutions to Rev. Proc. 64-19, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 517 (1965);
Comment, Marital Deduction Pecuniary Formula Bequests: Revenue Pro-
cedure 64-19 and N.Y. Personal Property Law § 17-f, 30 ALBANY L. REV.
262 (1966) ; Comment, The Marital Deduction-Effect of Revenue Procedure
64-19, 33 TENN. L. REv. 493 (1966); Note, Revenue Procedure 64-19 and
the Effect of State Court Treatment of Formula Clauses on the Executor's
Dilemma, 53 GEORGETowN L.J. 791 (1965); Note, The Estate Tax Marital
Deduction-Revenue Procedure 64-19, 41 IND. L.J. 711 (1966); 18 VAND. L.
REv. 319 (1964).
"Although post-mortem manipulations provoked the issuance of Revenue
Procedure 64-19, the Treasury stated that on technical grounds the Pro-
cedure was leveled at the pecuniary interest bequest under which "the interest
in property passing from the decedent to his surviving spouse would not be
ascertainable as of the date of death, if the property available for distribu-
tion included assets which might fluctuate in value." Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.03,
1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 683.
"
5Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01(2), 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 684. Although
"specific assets" is the phraseology used, it would seem that a bequest of a
class of property, such as "all the real estate I own," would escape the thrust
of Revenue Procedure 64-19. See Sugarman, supra note 10, at 262.
" Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01 (1), 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 684. This ex-
emption is premised upon the conclusion that a fractional share clause, when
coupled with the requirement that all beneficiaries, marital and non-marital,
share proportionately in appreciation or depreciation of assets until distri-
bution date, or dates, does not facilitate the same degree of manipulation as
is possible with the pecuniary interest bequest. The difference results from
the fact that the fractional share, determined by the use of federal estate
tax values, becomes fixed once the adjusted gross estate and residuary
estate are certain and remains unaltered in its application throughout the
administration of the estate regardless of any change in asset values. Never-
[Vol. 46
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when employing this exemption because the judicial interpretation
which may be assigned to a particular bequest cannot always ac-
curately be predicted, with the unsettling result that an intended
fractional share8 7 bequest may be construed to be an objectionable
pecuniary interest bequest that effectuates loss of the entire marital
deduction.
3 8
(3) The Procedure does not apply to a pecuniary interest be-
quest, formula or non-formula, where any one of the following ele-
ments is present :a (a) the marital bequest is to be satisfied solely
in cash;4° or (b) the fiduciary has no discretion in the selection of
assets to be distributed in kind; 4 or (c) the assets chosen by the
theless, qualifying under this escape provision of the Procedure is not al-
ways as easy as might initially appear. Specifically, all fractional share
bequests are not exempt, but only those "under which each beneficiary
shares proportionately in the appreciation or depreciation in the value of
assets to the date, or dates, or distribution." Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01(1),
1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 684; Lloyd 899-900. Furthermore, although this
exemption has been sanctioned presently, abusive utilization of any fractional
share bequest similar to that found in the history of the pecuniary interest
bequest may precipitate parallel proscriptions. See Lloyd 899-900.
" To its already substantial list of supporters (see, e.g. Durand, supra
note 5, at 873-74; Durbin, supra note 5, at 545; Lovell, supra note 5, at
812-13; Report of Subcommittee on Estate Planning and the Marital De-
duction, 102 TausTs & ESTATES 934, 945 (1963), the fractional share be-
quest garnered additional advocates subsequent to the promulgation of
Revenue Procedure 64-19. See Alexander, supra note 33, at 491; Lauritzen,
supra note 9, at 396; Lloyd 900; and Waters, supra note 9, at 370-71. One
attractive feature of the fractional share bequest is that normally there is no
gain or loss recognized on the distribution of assets since no fixed dollar
amount is being satisfied. See note 19 supra; Kohn, supra note 2, at 244-45;
Rev. Rul. 55-117, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 233. However, under certain circum-
stances income tax liability to the estate and the surviving spouse may re-
sult. See Edwards 266-67. Furthermore, the fractional share bequest po-
tentially poses serious administrative burdens, for example, the complexity
of distributing assets in conformity with the fractional share. See Polasky,
844-56.
For excellent discussions of the fractional share bequest, see Durbin,
supra note 5; Friedman & Wheeler, Selection and Drafting of Marital
Deduction Formula Clauses, 106 TRUSTS & ESTATES 799 (1967).
" For comments on actual cases involving the issue of fractional share
versus pecuniary interest, the executor's dilemma when faced with am-
biguously phrased bequests, and suggested approaches in light of Revenue
Procedure 64-19, see Polasky 857 & n.160; Wright, supra note 9, at 103-04;
Note, Revenue Procedure 64-19 and the Effect of State Court Treatment of
Formula Clauses on the Executors Dilemma, 53 GEORGETOwy L.J. 791, 792-
802 (1965).
" The presence of any one of the features enumerated in the text elim-
inates an essential ingredient in the post-mortem manipulation scheme pre-
viously discussed. See notes 21-32 supra and accompanying text.
'Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01(3) (a), 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 684.
"Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01(3) (b), 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 684.
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fiduciary to be distributed in kind in funding the marital bequest
must be valued at their respective values on the date, or dates, of
their distribution.42
The mandates of Revenue Procedure 64-19 are aimed at the
pecuniary interest clause where the following features are present:
(1) a bequest of a certain pecuniary amount to qualify for the mari-
tal deduction; and (2) a clause that the fiduciary is required, or is
given the discretion, to select the assets in kind to fund the marital
bequest; and (3) a clause that, in valuing the assets for distribution
purposes, the fiduciary shall use federal estate tax values.43
If all of the above elements are present,44 the Procedure dis-
allows the marital deduction in toto,45 unless certain prescribed con-
'Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01(3)(c), 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 684. Where
there is no indicia in a state's statutory or case law that, unless a contrary
intent is expressed by the testator, the executor must distribute assets using
date-of-distribution values, an official of the Internal Revenue Service has
stated that "the Service will assume that the state will follow the general
rule that assets are distributed at date of distribution values," thereby saving
the marital deduction from the grasp of Revenue Procedure 64-19. Rogovin,
The Sound and the Fury: Official Views on Revenue Procedure 64-19, 104
TRUSTS & ESTATES 432, 435 (1965).
"The purpose of this Revenue Procedure is to state the position of the
Internal Revenue Service relative to allowance of the marital deduction
in cases where there is some uncertainty as to the ultimate distribution to
be made in payment of a pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust where
the governing instrument provides that the executor or trustee may
satisfy bequests in kind with assets at their value as finally determined
for federal estate tax purposes.
Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 1, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 682-83 (emphasis added).
"For a sample pecuniary formula bequest containing the three features
mentioned in the text, see note 22 supra. It should be noted that the Pro-
cedure's mandates can be triggered by either a formula or non-formula
pecuniary bequest. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.01, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 683.
Technically, the Procedure applies to a cash bequest of a stated dollar amount
when the bequest may be funded with assets in kind valued at federal estate
tax values for distribution purposes. "However," one commentator has stated,
"I have never seen or heard of such a legacy." Covey, The Marital Deduc-
tion: Revenue Procedure 64-19 and Formula Provisions, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 317
(1964). This commentary evidences the fact that the pecuniary formula
bequests will provide the principal target for the Procedure's mandates. See
Comment, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction-Revenue Procedure 64-19,
41 IND. L.J. 711, 715 (1966).
" One might contend that the effect of the Procedure should be negated
where the defective pecuniary interest bequest contains the following
proviso: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this instrument I direct
that my executor(s) (or my trustee(s)) shall not exercise any power or
privilege granted by this instrument if and to the extent that the exercise
thereof would adversely affect the allowance of the marital deduction." See
also Covey, Statutory Panacea for 64-19f: Existing and Proposed Remedies
for Marital Deduction Problem, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 69, 70 (1965).
However, an official of the Internal Revenue Service has stated that such a
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ditions are met. Specifically, they are satisfied if "by virtue of the
duties imposed on the fiduciary either by applicable state law or by
the express or implied provisions of the instrument, it is clear that the
fiduciary, in order to implement such a bequest... ,"
1. must distribute assets, including cash, having an aggregate
fair market value at the date, or dates, of distribution amounting
to no less than the amount of the pecuniary bequest or transfer,
as finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes . . . , or
2. must distribute assets, including cash, fairly representative
of appreciation or depreciation in the value of all property thus
available for distribution in satisfaction of such pecuniary bequest
or transfer .... 46
Under either requirement number 1 (hereinafter referred to as
the "no less than" distribution technique) or requirement number 2
(hereinafter referred to as the "net appreciation-depreciation" dis-
tribution technique), assets may still be valued according to federal
estate tax values for the purpose of calculating the amount of the
marital bequest.4 7 However, date-of-distribution values are used to
determine if the assets were distributed in compliance with these
requirements.4 s Prior to a more extensive comparative analysis of
"boots-strap" clause will not place the instrument without the Procedure's
purview. Rogovin, supra note 42, at 435; IRS Chief Counsel Answers the
Most Troublesome Questions on Rev. Proc. 64-19, 22 3. TAx. 348, 351
(1965); cf. Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824, 827-28 (4th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944). Thus, the lethal nature of Revenue Pro-
cedure 64-19 must not be underemphasized: failure to pass muster under the
Procedure's mandates results in loss of the entire marital deduction. Sugar-
man, supra note 10, at 264; Comment, The Marital Deduction--Effect of
Revenue Procedure 64-19, 33 TEIN. L. REV. 493, 498 (1966). One com-
mentator has stated that there is a "substantial likelihood" that the Pro-
cedure will be enforced by the courts. Colson, supra note 25, at 70. But see
Note, 43 N.C.L. REv. 459, 468 (1965).
" Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02, 1964-1 Cum. BuLL. 682, 683 (emphasis
added).
"' See Lloyd 898, 899 (1964). Although to date there is no statutory au-
thority for allowing assets in kind to be valued at federal estate tax values
for distribution purposes, Geller, Revenue Procedure 64-19: "Variable"
Pecuniary Bequests, N.Y.U. 23Ra INsT. ON FED. TAX., 1157, 1161 & n.23
(1965), Revenue Procedure 64-19 facilitates the negative inference that aside
from the marital deduction aspects, the Treasury will continue to sanction
this fiduciary discretion. Furthermore, there is nothing inherent in the Pro-
cedure to indicate that the Service objects to using this valuation strategy to
avoid potential income tax recognition when appreciated assets are dis-
tributed. See Geller, supra, at 1164.
" It should not be overlooked that, when the fiduciary is funding a bequest
according to the terms of either distribution scheme, cash must be included
with the distributable assets if the Procedure is to be satisfied. Rev. Proc.
64-19, § 2.02, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 683.
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the two distribution techniques,49 it should be helpful to underline the
pitfalls surrounding reliance on either approach." The discussion
will cover separately instruments executed before October 1, 1964,
and those executed after September 30, 1964.
A. Post-September 30, 1964, Instruments
If the marital deduction is to be allowed under a post-Septem-
ber 30, 1964, instrument which contains the defective pecuniary
bequest language, it must be "clear" that the fiduciary is required to
distribute assets, including cash, according to the terms of one and
only one of the distribution techniques.5 1 The requisite directive to
the fiduciary can be located in the express or implied provisions of
the instrument or the state case law or a state statute, but in any
event the directive must be "clear."
52
Because the term is left undefined by the Procedure, resolving
what is "clear" poses a continual problem. 3 For instance, the most
striking example of what is not "clear" is provided by a Mississippi
statute, subsequently repealed. The legislation declared that if the
instrument embodied a proscribed pecuniary interest bequest, the
fiduciary shall make such distributions by either the "no less than"
'
9 See notes 91-249 infra and accompanying text.
50 Due to the highly technical nature of Revenue Procedure 64-19 and the
substantial number of instruments containing the defective pecuniary be-
quests language, officials of the Internal Revenue Service have attempted
to provide answers to some of the anticipated problems surrounding the
Procedure's application. E.g., Rogovin, Revenue Procedure 64419: Ad-
inistrative History, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 940 (1965); Rogovin, supra
note 42; Sheets, Practical Solutions to 64,19: "Unofficial" Answers to
Marital Deduction Questions, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 71 (1965); IRS Chief
Counsel Answers the Most Troublesome Questions on Rev. Proc. 64.19, 22
J. TAX. 348 (1965) ; IRS Official Gives Views on Marital Deduction Clauses
Under Rev. Proc. 64-19, 22 J. TAX. 39 (1965); Revenue Procedure 64-19:
Panel Discussion, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 917 (1964).
"' Rev. Proc. 64-19, §§ 2.02, -.03, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 682, 683; Sugar-
man, "Pecuniary Formula" Marital Deduction Bequests: Application of
Revenue Procedure 64-19, 16 W. RES. L. REv. 257, 263-64 (1965).
" Rev. Proc. 64-19, §§ 2.02, -.03, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 683; text
accompanying note 46 supra.
" For example, acceptance of the advice of counsel relative to an in-
strument's textual provisions may prove costly if the Service's interpreta-
tions should be contra. See Colson, supra note 25, at 75. Such unfortunate
reliance on the advice of counsel might be occasioned by the "boot-straps"
clause (note 45 supra and accompanying text) and by a mistaken construc-
tion as to whether a bequest were a fractional share or a pecuniary interest
(notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text).
[Vol. 46
REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19
technique or the "net appreciation-depredation" technique.54 Fur-
thermore, the Internal Revenue Service has stated that if the fiduci-
ary is not restricted to one and only one of the techniques, distribu-
tions in conformity with either one of the two techniques shall be
viewed as a hollow gesture, with the resulting forfeiture of the
entire marital deduction.55
B. Pre-October 1, 1964, Instruments
When a pre-October 1, 1964, instrument contains defective pe-
cuniary interest language, the marital deduction similarly will be
honored by the Service if it is "clear" that in distributing assets,
including cash, the fiduciary's discretion is limited to one and only
one of the "no less than" and "net appreciation-depreciation" tech-
niques.5" Consequently, pre-October 1, 1964, instruments will pose
problems identical to some of those encountered in dealing with
post-September 30, 1964, instruments.5 7 On the other hand, pre-
October 1, 1964, instruments will present other pitfalls because with
these latter instruments there are additional avenues through which
' Miss. CODE ANN. § 644.5 (Supp. 1964), repealed by Miss. Laws 1966,
S.B. 1633. A new statute has been enacted which requires the executor
to distribute assets under only the "net appreciation-depreciation" technique.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 644.7 (Supp. 1967).
While the Procedure is somewhat less than "clear" in forbidding the de-
gree of discretion sanctioned by the original Mississippi statute, it cannot
be doubted that the remedial thrust of the Procedure is premised on the
prohibition of this discretion and the attendant evil of post-mortem manipu-
lation. See Covey, supra note 45, at 69. "The reason for the Service's
position is obvious. If the rule were otherwise, the opportunity to minimize
the amount passing to the widow, based upon events occurring after the
decedent's death, would still be present through the use of requirement 1
["no less than" technique] if the estate increased in value and requirement 2
["net appreciation-depreciation" technique] if the estate decreased in value.
As previously indicated, it is this opportunity to which the Procedure is
directed." R. CovEY, THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND THE USE OF FORMULA
PROVISIONS 47 (1966). Furthermore, it appears certain that the Procedure
will be so enforced. See Alexander, supra note 33, at 492; Cohen, Treasury
Views on Current Questions, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 9, 10 (1965). Contra,
18 VAND L. REv. 319, 322-23 (1964).
" Sheets, supra note 50 at 72; Lloyd 899. But see Note, N.C.L. REv.
459, 468 (1965). The Service's insistence on disallowing the marital de-
duction when the fiduciary's discretion is not clearly limited is premised
on the conclusion that in such circumstances the interest in property passing
to the surviving spouse is not ascertainable as of the date of death. Rogovin,
supra note 42, at 432-34; Sheets, supra note 50, at 72. See also Jackson v.
United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964).
" Rev. Proc. 64-19, §§ 2.02, -.03, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 683; notes 53-55
supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.
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the marital deduction may be achieved within the strictures of the
Procedure.58
Where the governing instrument is a will or a transfer in trust
which can be amended and the maker is alive and competent, certain
basic choices are available, each with its own distinct pitfalls. Leav-
ing the document unaltered will lessen the attorney's burden at
present. Nevertheless, many commentators have advocated drafting
new instruments whenever possible,6" to achieve not only a greater
likelihood of compliance with the Procedure but also a frequently
needed general review and revision of the instrument.
The prospect of educating the client about the consequences of
reexecuting a will, however, might prompt many attorneys to use a
codicil.6 Unfortunately, a misstep under this approach can have
serious repercussions.6 2 First, a poorly drafted amendment might
not repair the instrument so as to conform to the "clear" mandate.
Therefore, since the Procedure speaks in terms of writings "exe-
cuted" before October 1, 1964,13 any alteration might be construed
as a republication of the instrument,4 thereby removing it from the
" The availability of the various avenues will depend in varying de-
grees on the status of three principal factors: whether the maker is capable
of reexecuting the will or transfer in trust, whether the provisions of the
instrument or applicable state laws are "clear," and whether the maker is
apprised of his alternatives in light of Revenue Procedure 64-19. For a
discussion in outline form of the various alternatives available when a pre-
October 1, 1964, instrument contains defective pecuniary bequest language,
see Gradwohl, Marital Deduction "Viewed as at the Date of the Decedent's
Death," 45 NEB. L. REv. 457, 465-68 (1966).
Furthermore, the attorney may have an affirmative ethical duty to advise
his client about the Procedure, a subsequent development which may ad-
versely affect his desired disposition plan. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHIacs, OPINIONs, No. 210.
" E.g., Gradwohl, supra note 58, at 465-68; Polasky, Marital Deduction
Formuda Clauses in Estate Planning-Estate and Income Tax Considerations,
63 MicH. L. Rav. 809, 821-27 (1965); Sugarman, supra note 51, at 266-76.
" See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 36, at 492; Colson, The Marital De-
duction and Revenue Procedure 64-19, 10 PRAc. LAW, 69, 78 (Oct. 1964);
Weinstock, The Marital Deduction--Problems and Answers Under Revenue
Procedure 64-19, 43 TAxEs 340, 344-46 (1965).
" See, e.g., Golden, Rev. Proc. 64-19: Implication's for Attorneys and
Fiduciaries, 103 TRusTs & ESTATEs 536, 538 (1964).2 See Sugarman, supra note 51, at 271.
" Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 3.01, 1964-1 Cum. BuLL. 682, 683-84; See Covey,
supra note 44, at 321-22.
"'It appears to be the law in North Carolina that a codicil acts as a
republication with the result that the instrument thereafter speaks as of the
date of the codicil. Young v. Williams, 253 N.C. 281, 116 S.E.2d 778 (1960) ;
it re Coffield, 216 N.C. 285, 4 S.E.2d 870 (1939); Hatch v. Hatch 3 N.C. 32
(1798). For the law in other jurisdictions regarding the effect on an instru-
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category of pre-October 1, 1964, documents. 5 Furthermore, the
Procedure provides that, in the case of pre-October 1, 1964, instru-
ments wherein the "clear" requirement is not satisfied by the instru-
ment's provisions or applicable state law, the executor and surviving
spouse may sign agreements, filed with the Internal Revenue Service,
whereby the marital deduction is saved. 6 However, this escape
provision is available only when a pre-October 1, 1964, instrument is
involved.67  Therefore, a poorly drafted codicil or trust amend-
ment may create a double-edged sword.
Reliance on the agreements alone, however, is risky. Agreements
may be employed only when the pre-October 1, 1964, instrument or
the applicable state law is not "clear."6 Distributions of property,
including cash, must be made only under the "net appreciation-de-
preciation" technique.69 Among other problems,7° the executor must
ment by the execution of a codicil, see Lauritzen, Marital Deduction Be-
quests-Current Problems and Drafting Suggestions, 8 TAx COUNSELORS Q.
125, 279 (1964).
" In anticipation that execution of a codicil might result in republication,
the IRS has stated that it "will regard such [fiduciary's] powers as relating
to the time the original will was executed, as long as the bequest is not men-
tioned in or in any way affected by the codicil." IRS Chief Counsel Answers
the Most Troublesome Questions on Rev. Proc. 64-19, 22 J. TAx. 348, 351
(1965). However, there is no specification of phraseology which will
guarantee qualification within the bounds of the formula "not mentioned
in or in any way affected by ...."
" A form of agreement to be executed by the surviving spouse can be
found in Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 5.01, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 684-85. A form of
agreement to be executed by the executor or trustee can be found in Rev.
Proc. 64-19, § 5.02, 1964-1 Cum. BuLI 682, 685.
An official of the Service has declared that the District Director may
accept modifications in these agreements if such would be helpful in the
audit of the return and does not change the substance of the basic agreement
required. Sheets, Determination of the Interest in Property Passing to the
Surviving Spouse Required by Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 and Revenue Procedure 64-19, 46 C:rI. B. RucoRD 117, 121 (1964).
Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 3.01, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 683-84.
"Id.; Gradwohl, supra note 58, at 467.
Rev. Proc. 64-19, §§ 3.01, 5.01-.02, 1964-1 Cu . BULL. 682, 683-84.
Therefore, the fiduciary will be faced with the dilemma created when the
testator's intent is contrasted with the effect of the "net appreciation-deprecia-
tion" distribution technique, whereby the surviving spouse will receive a
greater share of the assets if there is an appreciation in the aggregate value
of the estate. Was the testator's predominant desire to limit the amount
distributed to the surviving spouse or was it to achieve the marital deduction,
notwithstanding the size of the amount received by the surviving spouse?
See Comment, The Marital Deduction--Effect of Revenue Procedure 64-19,
33 TENN. L. Rnv. 493, 501 (1966).
"' See Stevens, Revenue Procedure 64-19: Administrative Problems of Fi-
duciaries in Working with Formula Classes, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 949
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be certain that he has authority, either by state statute or a court
adjudication, to enter into the requisite agreement. 1' Assuming the
executor has authority,72 there remains the problem of securing the
surviving spouse's signature to the agreements. 3 Furthermore, dis-
tributions pursuant to the secured agreements, which require ex-
clusive use of the "net appreciation-depreciation" method, will in-
crease the fiduciary's administrative burdens.' Also, the fiduciary
must be continually alert to the fact that if he fails to distribute as-
(1965); Straus, Revenue Procedure 64-19: When Should Agreements Be
Made?, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 911 (1964); Sugarman, supra note 51, at
266-70.
"' See Geller, Revenue Procedure 64-19: "Variable" Pecuniary Bequests,
N.Y.U. 23RD INsT. o N FED. TAX., 1157, 1167-68 (1965). To avoid a future
lawsuit, the fiduciary might be wise to secure court approval of the agree-
ment with all interested parties joined in the proceeding and, where neces-
sary, with guardians appointed for minors, contingent interests and unascer-
tained beneficiaries. See Colson, supra note 60, at 78.
" If the executor refuses to sign the required agreement, some com-
mentators have expressed the view that the marital deduction may never-
theless be saved by the surviving spouse electing against the instrument
where such action is sanctioned by state law. See Colson, supra note 60, at 79;
Gradwohl, supra note 58, at 466-67. But see Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(c)
(1962). See generally, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction: A Procrustean
Bed of Perplexities, 34 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 319, 341-43 (1965).
" In cases where the surviving spouse has died the Service has stated it
will accept the signature of the surviving spouse's executor or legal repre-
sentative. Sheets, supra note 50, at 72. Likewise when incapacitation is the
obstacle, the Service will honor the signature of any authorized person by
whose signing the surviving spouse would be bound. Id. However, the In-
ternal Revenue Service is powerless to help when the surviving spouse is un-
willing. The likelihood of such a posture is not remote. In an often repeated
example, the surviving spouse is informed that if the agreements are not
signed, the resulting higher taxes occasioned by the loss of the marital
deduction will be paid by the residuary estate. The frequent response is,
"How wonderful ?" See Golden, supra note 61, at 539. North Carolina is one
state in which, if the decedent did not make a testamentary provision to the
contrary, the estate tax burden will fall entirely on the residuary estate.
Buffaloe v. Barnes, 226 N.C. 313, 38 S.E.2d 222 (1946). Consequently, the
surviving spouse does not have the tax burden to provide a negative incentive
to sign the agreement for the purpose of saving the marital deduction. How-
ever, such an impetus is present in twenty-two states where, absent a con-
trary testamentary provision, the estate tax is allocated among the bene-
ficiaries according to their share. P-H FED. EST. & GirT TAX REP.
120, 025-120, 026. See generally Durand, Planning Lessons from Marital
Deduction Litigation, 101 TRusTs & ESTATES 8 (1962).
T4See Sugarman, supra note 51, at 266-70. Pursuant to the agreement, the
fiduciary must file with the District Director, within six months after the
last distribution in satisfaction of the marital deduction bequest, a schedule
presenting the marital distributions made subsequent to the date of the agree-
ment, the assets, including cash, available for distribution at each distribu-
tion date, and the fair market value of each asset at distribution date. Rev.
Proc. 64-19 § 5.02, 1964-1 Cum. BuLL. 682, 685.
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sets according to the agreements and the surviving spouse receives
less than the amount required thereunder, a gift will be considered as
having been made by the surviving spouse to the other beneficiaries
in whose favor the failure occurred. 75
In an attempt to avoid the loss of the entire marital deduction
and also the aforementioned pitfalls under both pre-October 1, 1964,
and post-September 30, 1964, instruments, some states have under-
taken a reappraisal of their state law with a view toward satisfying
the "clear" requirement.
THE STATUS OF "APPLICABLE STATE LAW"
At the time of the Procedure's issuance, the "clear" requirement
was not satisfied unequivocally by the law of any state, either de-
cisional or statutory.76 Furthermore, a review of current state law
" Id. at § 3.02, 684. It should be noted that signing of the agreements does
not itself constitute a gift. Id. at § 3.01, 683-84. Furthermore, the gift tax
liability can be vitiated if, when apprised of the fact, the surviving spouse
makes seasonable objection and initiates appropriate state law procedure
to rectify the situation. Id. at § 3.02, 684. For discussions concerning when
the surviving spouse might be subject to a gift tax, see Rogovin, The Sound
and the Fury: Official Views on Revenue Procedure 64-19, 104 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 432, 434 (1965); IRS Chief- Counsel Answers the Most Trouble-
sonie Questions on Rev. Proc. 64-19, 22 J. TAx. 348, 349-50 (1965).
"' Although the law of no state clearly complied with the Procedure when
issued, three states-New York, Oregon and Illinois-had judicial determina-
tions which many felt might be held to require exclusive use of the "net ap-
preciation-depreciation" technique, thereby saving the marital deduction.
New York had case law to the effect that under a pecuniary interest
bequest where in-kind distributions were to be made at federal estate tax
values, the distributions nevertheless were to be made so that all beneficiaries
"shall share proportionately in the appreciation and in the depreciation. .. ."
In re Bush's Will, 2 App. Div. 2d 526, 156 N.Y.S.2d 897, 901, aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d
908, 145 N.E.2d 872, 167 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1956). Accord, Matter of Inman,
22 Misc. 2d 573, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Surr. Ct., N.Y. County 1959). In 1965,
however, the New York legislature enacted a statute denominating the "no
less than" technique as the applicable state law. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW
§ 17-f(2)(b) (1965).
It has been suggested that the Oregon case of In re Nicolai's Estate, 232
Ore. 105, 373 P.2d 967 (1962), possibly might satisfy the "clear" require-
ment via the "net appreciation-depreciation" technique. See R. CovEY, THE
MARITAL DEDUCTION AND THRE: USE OF FORMULA PROVISIONS 47 (1966);
Cantwell, Procedure 64-19: Statutory Relief, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 953
(1965). Iowever, instead of stating that ratable sharing was required under
a defective pecuniary interest bequest, the court grappled with the instru-
ment's phraseology--"a portion of my estate"-and concluded it specified
a fractional share bequest, with the logical effect that sharing in appreciation
or depreciation was required. Furthermore, in its determination, the court
relied heavily on the testator's intent as opposed to an implementation of
specific state law. See Report of Committee on Administration and Distribu-
tion of Decedent Estates, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 976, 983 (1965). There-
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reveals a surprisingly small segment of relevant law which comple-
ments Revenue Procedure 64-19 in an attempt to lessen its impact.
77
To date only seventeen states have responded to the Procedure, all
through the avenue of their legislatures. 78 A brief description of
these statutes should provide the necessary background for a com-
parative examination of the three basic types that have emerged.
The "net appreciation-depreciation" distribution technique pres-
ently is embodied in the statutes of fourteen states.7 Modeled after
the language of the Procedure, this technique directs the fiduciary
to fund the marital bequest with assets, including cash, which are
fairly representative of the net appreciation or net depreciation of all
fore, it can be persuasively argued that the case is limited to its facts as a
construction of only one instrument containing the language "a portion of my
estate," gives no reliable indication of what the result would be if the court
were confronted with terminology which it classified as true pecuniary in-
terest bequest language, and represents only one of a long line of cases where
the pecuniary-fractional share question must be resolved.
The unreported Illinois case of Estate of Kircheimer, Ill. Probate Ct.,
Cook County, July 13, 1964, file No. 56 P. 8017, likewise might be considered
as qualifying under the applicable state law provision. Indeed, an official of
the Internal Revenue Service has made an "unofficial" statement to this
effect. Sheets, supra note 66, at 119. Contra, Bassiouni, The Marital De-
duction Rule and Revenue Procedure 64-1.9, 2 ILL. CoNT. LEGAL ED.
89, 93 (Oct. 1964). This case, however, seemingly is vulnerable to the
same attacks aimed at the Oregon decision. Furthermore, the fact that the
Illinois adjudication was rendered by an inferior state court would appear to
caution against reliance thereon when the marital deduction is at stake.
" The caution often is raised that careful thought should proceed and
accompany any attempt to legislate curative measures premised on tax con-
siderations when the effect also might be a radical alteration in the testator's
desired distribution plan. At least such enactments should provide an escape
mechanism "when the instrument provides to the contrary." See Polasky 885.
"
8Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 7(3) (Supp. 1965); Arkansas, ARK.
LAws 1967, Act 209; California, CAL. PRoD. CODE § 1029 (Supp. 1967);
Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 153-10-49 (enacted by Colo. Laws 1965,
ch. 327); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 734.031 (Supp. 1966); Georgia, GA.
LAws 1967, H.B. 54; Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 392 (Supp.
1967); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525-528 (Supp. 1966); Mississippi,
Miss. CODE ANN. § 644.7 (Supp. 1967); New York, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW
§ 17-f(2) (b); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28.158.1 (Supp. 1965);
Ohio, OHIO REv. CODE § 1339.41 (Page Supp. 1967); South Carolina, S.C.
,CODE ANN. § 19-567 (Supp. 1967); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. 64-71.2(b)
(Supp. 1966); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 44-5.12 (Supp. 1967); Wis-
consin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 231.55, 318.5 (Supp. 1967).
A proposed statute in Connecticut was rejected apparently due to opposi-
tion by the Connecticut Bankers and Bar Associations. See Cantwell, supra
note 76, at 953.
" Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. For the citations to the statutory enactments of these four-
teen states, see note 78 supra.
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assets thus available for distribution, no more and no less.8 ° There-
fore, his discretion to select non-cash assets, as granted by the in-
strument,81 is severely circumscribed, specifically preventing a diver-
sion of either appreciation or depreciation away from or to the sur-
viving spouse. While the interest acquired by the surviving spouse is
fixed, the amount required to be given the marital bequest will
fluctuate throughout the estate's administration and ultimately will
be determined only with a winding up of the estate.8" This distribu-
tion technique has the practical effect of converting a pecuniary
bequest into a fractional share formula," absent the requirement that
the surviving spouse receive a pro-rata fraction of each asset.
Another type of applicable state law originating in the language
of the Procedure itself is the "no less than" technique, which pre-
sently is employed only by two states, each by statute." This distri-
bution approach imposes one additional requirement upon the instru-
ment's provisions: the aggregate date-of-distribution value of assets,
including cash, received by the surviving spouse must be no less
than the amount of the marital deduction, as finally determined un-
der the instrument's terms using federal estate tax values.5 There-
fore, while there is a minimum or "floor" amount that must be
funded to the marital share, this technique neither forbids nor com-
pels the fiduciary to distribute assets the aggregate date-of-distribu-
tion value of which is greater than the "floor."8 " This potential
latitude facilitates a degree of post-mortem estate planning which
8oRev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02, 1964-1 CuM. Butm. 682, 683.
A typical pecuniary interest bequest empowering the fiduciary to make
distributions in kind is set out at note 22 supra.8 See Rogovin, supra note 75 at 432-33.
" See Sugarman, "Pecuniary Fomnula" Marital Deduction Bequests:
Application of Revenue Procedure 64-19, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 257, 273-74
(1965); Comment, Drafting Solutions to Rev. Proc. 64-19, 9 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 517, 524 (1965).
,Arkansas and California. See note 78 supra.
Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02, 1964-1 CuM. BuLL. 682, 683.
"See Covey, Statutory Panacea for 64-19f: Existing and Proposed
Remedies for Marital Deduction Problen, 104 TRusTs & ESTATES 69, 70
(1965); The Estate Tax Marital Deduction--Revenue Procedure 64-19, 41
IND. L.J. 711, 721 (1966). The interaction, however, of the instrument's
directives and the "no less than" mandate sometimes might necessitate fund-
ing the marital share with assets the aggregate date-of-distribution value of
which is in excess of the "floor." For example, if all the distributable assets
have appreciated, satisfaction of the instrument's requirement that the amount
of the marital bequest be calculated by federal estate tax values by definition
will cause the aggregate distribution date value of the marital share to ex-
ceed the "floor."
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is circumscribed somewhat under the "net appreciation-depreciation"
technique, where there must be strict compliance with the require-
ment of assets "fairly representative" of the estate's changing ag-
gregate value.
The third, and last, type of state law satisfying the "clear" man-
date is merely an adaptation of the "no less than" technique and is
utilized only by New York, by statute."" Under this approach, the
aggregate date-of-distribution value of distributable assets must be
no less than, as well as no more than, the amount of the marital be-
quest as determined by the instrument's provisions. The net result of
this technique, hereinafter referred to as "equal to," is that the sur-
viving spouse must receive assets, including cash, the aggregate date-
of-distribution value of which is precisely equal to the marital
bequest. Therefore, the latitude in post-mortem estate planning
occasioned by the "no less than" method is eliminated,"' and the re-
sulting restriction on the fiduciary's discretion to an exact date-of-
distribution dollar amount is similar in effect to the "net appreciation-
depreciation" approach.
There are features common to the three distribution techniques,
all of which guarantee the surviving spouse a dollar amount sufficient
to procure the maximum marital deduction as ascertained by ref-
erence to the instrument's provisions. Pursuant to the mandates of
the Procedure, cash must be included in the distributable assets when
calculations are made as to the amount the surviving spouse should
receive.89 Federal estate tax values are used to achieve compliance
with the directives of the instrument." Nevertheless, in conforming
"' N.Y. FERS. PROP. LAW § 17-f(2) (b). The New York statute, although
falling within the "equal to" classification, does not denominate a true
"equal to" technique. The fiduciary is directed to fund the marital share
with assets the aggregate date-of-distribution value of which is "no less
than, and to the extent practicable to vo nore than . .. " the marital bequest
as determined by the instrument's provisions. In all likelihood, this modicum
of fiduciary discretion sometimes will result in the aggregate date-of-distri-
bution value given the surviving spouse not being exactly "equal to" the
marital bequest. For comments on these and other aspects of the New York
statute, see R. COVEY, TnE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND THE USE OF FORMULA
PROVISIONS 18-19 (Supp. 1967); Cantwell, supra note 76, at 954; Comment,
Marital Deduction Pecuniary Formula Bequests: Revenue Procedure 64-19
and N.Y. Personal Property Law § 17-f, 30 ALBANY L. REV. 262 (1966).
" See notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text.
" Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 682, 683; see note 46 supra
and accompanying text.
" See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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to the Procedure, all three techniques impose supplemental require-
ments upon the instrument's distribution plan, which requisites must
be fulfilled by the utilization of date-of-distribution values.
Some distinctive differences among the three methods are readily
apparent, however. In regard to possible net appreciation or net
depreciation of the estate's distributable assets, the surviving
spouse cannot participate in any increase or decrease under the
"equal to" approach, may participate under the "no less than"
method, and must do so under the "net appreciation-deprecia-
tion" technique. Consequently, while the fiduciary has some dis-
cretion in making distributions in excess of the "floor" under the
"no less than" plan, the remaining two distribution techniques re-
quire strict compliance with a specific date-of-distribution figure
ascertained after the requisite calculations are made. A broader com-
parative analysis of these and other features hopefully will furnish
the needed foundation for recommending which technique a state
should adopt in response to Revenue Procedure 64-19.
A COMPARISON-ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
The ensuing discussion will focus on the three types of ap-
plicable state law and will leave aside the related, but separate, prob-
lem of drafting clauses that will pass muster under Revenue Pro-
cedure 64-19."1 Attention will be directed to seven considerations:
(1) ease of administration; (2) income taxes to the estate; (3) in-
come tax to the surviving spouse; (4) basis of asset to surviving
spouse; (5) charitable remainder deduction; (6) post-mortem estate
planning; (7) decedent's intent.
1. Ease of Administration
One administrative advantage which is equally present in all
three distribution methods is that the fiduciary has some discretion
"1 For discussions of the various clauses that should qualify under the
Procedure, see R. CovEY, supra note 87; FARR 297-303; Alexander, Revenue
Procedure 64-19: The New Marital Deduction Ride, 36 Miss. L.J. 485,
494-98 (1965); Ellick, Forms of Marital Deduction Gifts, Formula and
"Back-Up" Claueses, 45 NEE. L. REV. 468 (1966); Lloyd 898; McKenney,
Revenue Procedure 64-19: Drafting Suggestions for Marital Deductions,
104 TRuSTS & EsTATEs 961 (1965); Stevens, How to Draft Marital Deduc-
tion Fornuda Clauses uder Rev. Proc. 64-19, 20 J. TAX. 352 (1964); Voss,
The Marital Deduction and Revenue Procedure 64-19, 33 J. KAN. B. ASS'N
298, 301 (1964).
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in selecting the assets to be distributed.92 Specifically, even though
the surviving spouse has a dollar claim against the estate under all
three techniques, a claim to an interest in any particular asset of the
estate is not also granted.03 Therefore, a pro-rata division of any
asset will result from fiduciary discretion and not the legitimate de-
mands of the beneficiaries. It is clear that although the "net ap-
preciation-depreciation" method is similar in many respects to the
fractional share bequest, that clause's demand for fractionalization
of individual assets is not applicable. 4 Furthermore, the fiduciary's
discretion in selecting assets under any one of the techniques facili-
tates the funding of assets with high growth potential away from
the surviving spouse for the purpose of avoiding the increased tax
on the second estate. 5
There are some administrative burdens which are common to all
three distribution plans. First, the problem of allocating income
earned during the period of administration between the marital and
non-marital shares, one of the most vexing duties confronting a
fiduciary, will be present in the administration of an estate subject
to any one of the three methodsf Second, the bothersome require-
ment inherent in any pecuniary interest bequest will be applicable
to these techniques: varying with particular states, the marital share
normally must be preferred in order of satisfaction17 and must be
funded within a limited period of time (usually one year) or be
granted interest from that date."
92 For some this discretion may be viewed as a handicap as it only facili-
tates the occasion for bickering among beneficiaries as to particular distri-
butions. See notes 95, 99-103 infra and accompanying text.
" See Stevens, supra note 91, at 354-55.
9"See Comment, The Marital Deduction-Effect of Revenue Procedure
64-19, 33 TENN. L. REv. 493, 505 (1966).
5 See Sugarman, supra note 83, at 275. However, the fiduciary's ability
to allocate assets with varying growth potential causes some to view this dis-
cretion as a disadvantage since it only creates greater opportunities for ob-
jections by beneficiaries. See Golden, Rev. Proc. 64-19: Implications for
Attorneys and Fiduciaries, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 536, 538 (1964).
"The guidelines for allocation of income earned during the period of
administration are often embodied in state law. See generally R. CovEY,
supra note 87, at 13-25; Abernathy, Is It Income or Principal?: Allocating
Yield from Property Consumed in Administration, 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES 412
(1956); Bronston, State and Federal Taxation: Tax Problems of Formula
Type of Marital Deduction Bequest, 96 TRUSTS & ESTATES 887, 887-88
(1957).
'See Edwards 259-60, 263.
"In North Carolina pecuniary legacies must be funded generally within
one year of the decedent's death and, if not paid within this period, interest
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There are two administrative burdens which are present in all
three techniques, but with differing degrees of severity. The fiduci-
ary will always be subject to the attack that his distributions have
not been properly tailored to the particular technique. These com-
plaints will take various forms and can originate with either the
Service or the beneficiaries. For example, once the fiduciary has
satisfied the IRS by funding the "floor" amount under the "no less
than" approach, there remains the bickering among the beneficiaries
as to what amount, if any, should be funded the marital share in
excess of the "floor." 99
begins to accrue therefrom. Shepard v. Bryan, 195 N.C. 822, 143 S.E. 835(1928) ; Moore v. Pullen, 116 N.C. 284, 21 S.E. 195 (1895) ; Hart v. Wil-
liams, 77 N.C. 426 (1877). For the law of other states respecting time of
payment and interest, see T. ATKINSON, WILLS 751-53 (2d ed. 1953); 6
BOWE-PARKER: PAGE ON WILLS §§ 59.11 -.12 (rev. treatise 1962).
It might be contended, especially in regard to the "net appreciation-de-
preciation" method, that the state law in conformity with the Procedure
has effectuated such a significant metamorphosis in the instrument's pro-
visions that the hybrid result is not a pecuniary interest bequest. However,
any such argument would seem to overlook the nature of the transfiguration.
It does not appear that the applicable state law supplants the whole instru-
ment; it merely superimposes an additional requirement on the existing dis-
tribution plan. Consequently, the instrument's demand for an exact dollar
amount calculated by reference to federal estate tax values must still be ful-
filled. (See Polasky 827-33, where the author in discussing the operation of
the "no less than" and "net appreciation-depreciation" techniques acknowl-
edges that the conditions of the pecuniary interest bequest must be satisfied
notwithstanding the Procedure's mandates). Therefore, its pecuniary nature,
however mangled, remains viable, thereby qualifying under the requirement
of rapid payment or consequent interest.
" The state law employing the "no less than" technique could have a
preemptive effect in the area, thereby leaving unfettered the fiduciary's dis-
cretion to make distributions in excess of the "floor." If this is not clearly the
case, a beneficiary desiring to influence the distribution result might be able
to invoke the rule of impartiality. See Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N.Y. 114,
123 N.E. 135 (1919); Lauritzen, The Marital Deduction: Analysis of
Treasury Ruling on Pecuniary Formula Bequests, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES
318 (1964); Durand, Revenue Procedure 64-19: Planning Lessons froin
Marital Deduction Litigation, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 943, 945 (1965);
note 30 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, a state's decisional law
might nevertheless require the surviving spouse to share in appreciation or
depreciation of the estate even under the "no less than" technique, forcing
distributions to vary from the "floor" amount. This development likewise
could occur with the "equal to" method. For example, even though New
York now has a statute requiring an "equal to" approach, will the fiduciary
nevertheless be subject to In re Bush's Will, 2 App. Div. 2d 526, 156
N.Y.S.2d 897, aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 908, 145 N.E.2d 872, 167 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1956)
(note 76 supra), where the court required proportional sharing of appreciation
under an instrument where federal estate tax values were used for distribu-
tion purposes? See Polasky 885 n. 276; Comment, Marital Deduction Pe-
cuniary Formula Bequests: Revenue Procedure 64-19 and N.Y. Personal
Property Law § 17-f, 30 ALBANY L. REv. 262, 269-71 (1966).
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Many objections to the fiduciary's actions will involve the ques-
tion of the vaiuations placed on certain assets. With the "net ap-
preciation-depreciation" method, this type of complaint from the
Service and the beneficiaries likely will be identical in nature, but
often with antipathetic viewpoints. Assuming amicable family re-
lationships where a reduction in the surviving spouse's estate is
desired,100 the family will be claiming over-valuation of non-marital
assets and under-valuation of marital assets in order to give the
spouse as little in fact as possible. Meanwhile, the Service will be
resisting this contention or claiming the opposite appraisal,10 1 at the
same time looking for the foundation upon which to impose a gift
tax on the surviving spouse.
1 0 2
Side by side with the administrative burden of defending values
assigned is the duty to value the assets in the first place, and the num-
ber of separate valuations required will vary among the three tech-
niques. All of the estate's assets will have to be appraised at least
once for federal estate tax purposes, of course, as well as for com-
pliance with the provisions in the will. Compliance with the
mandates of the three techniques, however, will require additional
valuations.103
Under the "equal to" approach, second valuations will be neces-
sary only for those assets funded in satisfaction of the marital share.
100 For discussion concerning instances where there is a lack of agree-
ment between the surviving spouse and the other beneficiaries, see Durand,
supra note 99, at 943.
.0. See Hauser, Latest Developments in Taxation of Estates and Trusts
Raise New Caveats for Tax Men, 21 J. TAX. 32, 33 (1964); Sugarman,
supra note 83, at 273.
"' In regard to the specific situation where the surviving spouse does not
receive the required proportionate share of appreciation, the Service has
already indicated that a gift tax will result. Rogovin, supra note 75, at
434-35; Sheets, Practical Solutions to 64-19: "Unofficial' Answers to Marital
Deduction Questions, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATEs 71, 72 (1965).
103 For federal estate tax purposes, the fiduciary may elect to value the
assets at the date of the decedent's death, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2031, or
at the alternate valuation date, INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2032. Under this
latter alternative, it is the normal rule that assets are valued one year
from the date of the decedent's death, except that "in the case of property
distributed, sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of, within 1 year after
the decedent's death such property shall be valued as of the date of distribu-
tion, sale exchange or other disposition." Id. at § 2032(a) (1). Therefore,
to the extent that property is "sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of,
within 1 year after the decedent's death," the elective alternate valuation date
allows the disposal date value to satisfy the valuation requirements of both
the instrument and applicable state law, thereby reducing the multi-valua-
tions necessary in administering the estate.
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This same pattern will be followed with the "no less than" method,"0 4
save when distributions are made above the "floor" such as where a
local law requires equitable sharing of appreciation in the estate." 5
However, due to the twin valuation requisites of the instrument and
state law, 108 the second valuation problem under the above two
techniques will manifest itself differently where there has been
net appreciation or net depreciation in the estate's assets. Three
plausible hypotheticals should sufficiently illustrate the variance.
First, where slight net appreciation or depreciation has occurred
and some assets have decreased in value and others have increased,
employment of both the "equal to" and "no less than" approaches
will result almost invariably in second valuations of a large per-
centage of the estate's assets. This situation will arise even though
all appraised assets are not distributed to the surviving spouse.
The necessity for a significant number of second valuations will be
created by the usual desire to make such selections for the marital
share that the appreciated assets can be balanced off against de-
preciated ones. In this manner, the fiduciary hopefully will be able
to distribute assets with both federal estate tax values and date-of-
distribution values equivalent to the marital deduction without the
conversion of assets to cash."0 7 The exact date-of-distribution value
requirement under the "equal to" method will intensify the problem
in comparison to the "no less than" technique where the fiduciary is
not restricted to the "floor."
Second, a situation might arise where substantial net deprecia-
tion has occurred and aggregate date-of-distribution values barely
exceed the "floor" amount (which figure is identical to the exact
amount required to be distributed under the "equal to" method).
In this instance, it would appear that the Procedure's requisites will
take precedence over the instrument's provisions.' Therefore, un-
der both techniques the fiduciary would have to fund the marital
share with a larger percentage of the estate's assets to arrive at the
o, See Edwards 262-63.
1o See note 99 supra.
... See text accompanying notes 90-91, supra; The Estate Tax Marital
Deduction--Revenue Procedure 64-19, 41 IND. L.J. 711, 724 (1966).
' See Comment, Drafting Solutions to Rev. Proc. 64-19, 9 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 517, 523 (1965). For discussion regarding the disadvantages of con-
verting assets to cash, see notes 130-31 supra and accompanying text.
... See Edwards 263; Sheets, supra note 102, at 71.
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"floor" amount, notwithstanding the fact that the aggregate federal
estate tax values of the distributed assets exceed the marital be-
quest.' 9 The result should be the same even if the aggregate date-
of-distribution values were equivalent to or less than the marital
share. This increased quantity of second valuations will not arise
often in this era of gradual, and sometimes rapid, inflation." 0 How-
ever, if substantial net depreciation occurs, the Service has indicated
that the full marital deduction will nevertheless be allowed for fed-
eral estate tax purposes."'
The third situation is where there has been substantial net ap-
appreciation and the aggregate date-of-distribution values of the
least appreciated assets exceed the "floor" and the aggregate federal
estate tax values of the same assets are below this figure."' First,
there will have to be an increased number of second valuations in
order to discern the least appreciated assets desirable for distribution
to the surviving spouse. Secondly, there is the prospect of con-
verting the assets into cash to approach the "floor" amount. Both
problems can be negated to some extent under the "no less than"
method where the fiduciary is not restricted to the "floor," assuming
the absence of a local law requiring equitable sharing in apprecia-
tion." 3 However, the "equal to" technique will demand that dis-
tributions be tailored to an exact amount; therefore ascertaining the
least appreciated assets will require a greater volume of second
valuations to vitiate as much as possible the necessity of forced
sales." 4
Although a significant number of second valuations will thus
be required under the "equal to" and "no less than" methods, this
administrative burden will present a more formidable obstacle
"09 See Hauser, supra note 101, at 33; Comment, Drafting Solutions to
Rev. Proc. 64-19, 9 ST. Louis U.LJ. 517, 524 (1965).
110 See Durand, supra note 99, at 944, where the author uses actual stock
market fluctuations in illustrating the effects on the marital share as a result
of rapid rises and declines in stock prices.
... Sheets, Determination of the Interest in Property Passing to the Sur-
viving Spouse Required by Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 and Revenue Procedure 64-19, 46 CHi. B. REcORD 117, 119 (1964);
Sheets, supra note 102, at 71.
11 See Smith, New Marital Deduction Rule and Post October 1, 1964
Wills, 37 Wis. B. BULL. 7, 11-12 (Oct. 1964).
... See note 99 supra.
"
1
, The question of mandatory conversion of assets to cash will be dis-
cussed subsequently within a more expanded framework. See notes 130-35
infra and accompanying text.
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under the "net appreciation-depreciation" technique." 5 Since the
surviving spouse must receive assets which are "fairly representa-
tive of appreciation or depreciation,"' 6 second valuations of all dis-
tributable assets is mandatory," 7 except where the often undesirable
alternative of pro-rata distributions is pursued.", The burdensome
nature of the fiduciary's administrative duty becomes readily ap-
parent when two factors are considered: partial non-pro-rata dis-
tributions and the twin mandates of the instrument and relevant
state law.
When partial non-pro-rata distributions are made, second valua-
... See generally Polasky 827-33; Sugarman, supra note 83, at 273-74.
... The Procedure's directive-"the fiduciary must distribute assets, in-
cluding cash, fairly representative of appreciation or depreciation in the value
of all property thus available for distribution"--is susceptible of a variety
of interpretations. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02, 1964-1 Cum. BULT. 682, 683.
First, does this terminology specify that each asset received by the surviving
spouse must mirror the percentage of appreciation or depreciation that
has occurred in the value of the estate? Obviously, this is not the import of
the language; such a directive would require each asset to appreciate or de-
preciate to the same degree as the entire estate, a result which is highly
improbable with in-kind assets and impossible with cash assets where there
is any change in value of the estate. Second, does this language mean that
each time a distribution is made, the surviving spouse must receive assets
which, taken together, reflect the then appreciation or depreciation in the
assets available for distribution. See Ellick, supra note 91, at 479. Implicit
in statements by officials of the Service is a rejection of both these construc-
tions. Instead, the IRS makes what appears to be the most logical interpreta-
tion: the total quantity of assets received by the surviving spouse during the
administration of the estate and by way of its termination must reflect the
total appreciation or depreciation in the value of the estate that has occurred
during this same period. See Sheets, supra note 111, at 120-22; IRS Chief
Counsel Answers the Most Troublesome Questions on Rev. Proc. 64-19,
22 J. TAX. 348, 349-50 (1965).
1. The Procedure states that in implementing the "net appreciation-
depreciation" technique, "the fiduciary must distribute assets, including cash,
fairly representative of appreciation or depreciation in the value of all prop-
erty thus available for distribution .... ." Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02, 1964-1
Cum. BULL. 682, 683 (emphasis added). An official of the Service has stated
that the terminology "thus available" was used to denote the property which
came into the control of the fiduciary. Sheets, supra note 102, at 71-73.
Therefore, assets such as interests in trusts and jointly held property, which
do not come into the fiduciary's hands, will not be considered in calculating
proportional sharing by the surviving spouse. Id.
...A pro-rata distribution will, by definition, guarantee the surviving
spouse's proportional sharing in appreciation or depreciation, and therefore a
second valuation is not required. See Rogovin, The Sound and the Fury:
Official Views on Revenue Procedure 64-19, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 432,
435 (1965); Revenue Procedure 64-19: Panel Discussion, 103 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 917, 920 (1964). Unfortunately, however, a pro-rata distribution
frequently is undesirable, for example, in the case of close corporation stock
or real estate. See Edwards 266, 269-70.
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tions will be required not only for the distributed assets but also for
all remaining assets."' As with the readjustment of the fraction
under the fractional share bequest, similarly the surviving spouse's
proportional share must be recalculated when disproportionate dis-
tributions are made." ° For example, assume an adjusted gross
estate worth 2,000,000 dollars at federal estate tax valuation date
and a marital bequest of 1,000,000 dollars (one-half of the adjusted
gross estate). Before final distribution and when the estate's assets
total 4,000,000 dollars, assets equalling 800,000 dollars are dis-
tributed to non-marital beneficiaries. At this time, the net estate
value is 3,200,000 dollars while the surviving spouse's share is
2,000,000 dollars. Assume further that no more partial distributions
are made and that the value of the estate is 6,400,000 dollars at final
distribution date. Therefore, the surviving spouse's proportional
share is Y (2,000,000 dollars/3,200,000 dollars) of 6,400,000 dol-
lars, or 4,000,000 dollars; the non-marital share is Y (1,200,000
dollars/3,200,000 dollars) of 6,400,000 dollars, or 2,400,000 dol-
lars."21 Therefore, partial non-pro-rata distributions will involve not
only reevaluation of all assets but also attention to the fact that dis-
proportionate partial distribution to non-marital beneficiaries should
not be so large as to preclude the surviving spouse's proportional
share by way of the final distribution.'22 If such an objective is
foreclosed at the termination of the estate, a gift tax will be im-
posed on the surviving spouse to the extent of the underfunding1 23
The administrative difficulties occasioned by partial non-pro-rata
distributions under the "net appreciation-depreciation" technique
"'See FAIR, 301; Stevens, supra note 91, at 355; Revenue Procedure
64-19: Panel Discussion, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 917, 920 (1964).
121 In response to a question dealing with partial non-pro-rata distributions,
an official of the Internal Revenue Service has stated: "The construction
adopted by Rev. Proc. 64-19 treats bequests covered by its provisions [de-
nominating the "net appreciation-depreciation" technique] as bequests of
fractional shares. Therefore, any intermediate, disproportionate distribution
of any significance would require a revaluation of the property and an ad-
justment of the fraction." Sheets, supra note 102, at 72.
121For additional examples illustrating the second valuations and calcula-
tions attendant partial non-pro-rata distributions, see CASNER 660 (Supp.
1967); Rogovin, supra note 118, at 434; The Internal Revenue Service Posi-
tion on Marital Deduction Clauses: Revenue Ruling 64-19, 46 Cni. B. RECORD
5, 9-10 (1964).
"'" See Sugarman, supra note 83, at 268-69, 274.
... See note 75 supra and accompanying text; Hauser, supra note 101,
at 33; Sheets, supra note 102, at 72; Rogovin, supra note 118, at 435.
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are intensified by the fiduciary's obligation to satisfy twin valuation
requisites. 124 As to the instrument, the federal estate tax values of
distributed assets must be equal to the marital bequest. Concur-
rently, the aggregate date-of-distribution values of the identical
assets must be "fairly representative" of net appreciation or net
depreciation. To the extent that the Procedure's language of "fairly
representative,' ' 12 presumably perpetuated by the state law, allows
some deviation in date-of-distribution values, the administrative
burden is eased somewhat. 12  Notwithstanding, one commentator
has stated: "Yet the new pecuniary clause imposes concurrent re-
quirements which may tax the ingenuity of the executor."' 27 The
full impact of this prediction can easily be imagined where an estate
has 50 or more assets, many of which create difficult valuation prob-
lems such as close corporation stock 28 and many of which may be
constantly fluctuating in value.' 29 Indeed, the administrative task
occasioned by partial non-pro-rata distributions under the "net
appreciation-depreciation" method could well be Herculean.
Frequently, the three techniques will impose another administra-
tive burden on the fiduciary, i.e., forced conversion of assets to cash
to facilitate compliance with the twin valuation mandates. Such an
eventuality unfortunately will result in expenditure of the fiduciary's
time, administrative expenses to the estate, a relative financial loss
due to the nature of a forced sale, and income taxes to the estate
recognized from the sale of appreciated assets. 130 The necessity of
this conversion might arise under the "net appreciation-deprecia-
tion" approach where pro-rata distributions are impracticable. 3'
When all the assets of the estate have appreciated, the exact amount
mandate of the "equal to" method might require forced sales to
arrive at the instrument's requirements of federal estate tax values
" See Covey, The Marital Deduction: Revenue Procedure 64-19 and
Formuda Provisions, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 317, 325-26 (1964); Edwards 269-70;
Polasky 829-30.
... Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 683; text accompany-
ing note 46 szpra.
' See Polasky 829 nn.83-84.
127 Id. at 829.
.. See Weinstock, The Marital Deduction-Probleins and Answers Un-
der Revenue Procedure 64-19, 43 TAXEs 340, 346 (1965). For the manner
of valuation of unlisted stock and securities, see INT. REV. CODE Of 1954,
§ 2031 (b).
" See note 110 ampra.
.. See notes 13, 107 supra and accompanying text.
. See Polasky 830.
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equaling the marital bequest. This reduction of assets to cash might
be avoided under the "no less than" approach where date-of-distribu-
tion values may exceed the "floor." Where there has been a deprecia-
tion in all of the estate's assets, it is clear that both the "equal to"
and the "no less than" techniques require distributions of assets
Whose aggregate date-of-distribution values equal the "floor."18 2
However, it is not clear whether assets must be converted to cash to
satisfy the instrument's provisions that federal estate tax values also
equal the marital bequest or whether depreciated assets satisfying the
"floor" requirement nevertheless may be distributed without the
conversion to cash.
Notwithstanding the above hypotheticals, the "normal" estate
probably will contain some assets that have appreciated in value and
others that have depreciated, with an overall net appreciation in the
entire estate. In this circumstance, the relative advantage of the "no
less than" technique vis-A-vis the necessity of forced sales is ap-
parent.18 For example, assume an estate possessing four assets with
the following federal estate tax values: A asset (50,000 dollars) ;
B asset (50,000 dollars); C asset (50,000 dollars); and D asset
(50,000 dollars). Further assume the following date-of-distribu-
tion values; A asset (65,000 dollars) ; B asset (40,000 dollars) ; C
asset (90,000 dollars); and D asset (85,000 dollars). Under the
instrument's provisions the marital deduction is 100,000 dollars
using federal estate tax values. To satisfy the twin valuation re-
quirements when the "net appreciation-depreciation" method is em-
ployed, there will have to be a pro-rata distribution of all the assets
or a conversion to cash of some of them. Under the "equal to"
method, some assets will have to be converted to cash. However,
under the "no less than" approach, assuming no local law requiring
proportional sharing," the fiduciary can distribute assets whose ag-
gregate date-of-distribution values exceed the "floor" but whose ag-
gregate federal estate tax values equal the marital bequest. Spe-
cifically, the A and B assets (aggregate date-of-distribution values
of which are 105,000 dollars and therefore only 5,000 dollars above
the "floor") could be distributed to the surviving spouse, thereby
circumventing the necessity of forced sales.
182 See notes 108-11 supra and accompanying text.
"
8 See Lloyd 900.
... See note 99 supra.
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2. Income Taxes to the Estate
Any income taxes possibly recognizable by the estate could be
precipitated by two distinct acts: (1) conversion of in-kind assets
to cash; and (2) distributions of in-kind assets to beneficiaries. As
to the former, there is parity among the three techniques to the ex-
tent that under each method the reduction to cash will result in either
income tax gain or loss to the estate. The loss or gain will be deter-
mined by the disparity between the basis of the asset to the estate 3 5
and the amount realized upon the sale.1" 6 The basis to the estate
will be either the fair market value at the date of the decedent's
death 3 7 or the alternate valuation date3" which the fiduciary may
elect within certain prescribed conditions. 39 To determine whether
the gain or loss will be long term or short term,' 40 attention must
focus on the six month's holding period.'
Regarding potential income taxes to the estate by way of in-kind
distribution to beneficiaries, however, the three techniques do not
stand in parity. The general principle regarding a pecuniary interest
bequest funded with assets valued at date-of-distribution is that
when the bequest establishes a "fixed and definite 'dollar amount,'"
satisfaction of such fixed monetary claim with appreciated or depreci-
ated assets is equivalent to a "sale or exchange" with the concomitant
realization of gains and losses respectively." The gain or loss is
calculated by the variance between the basis of the asset to the
estate143 and the dollar obligation discharged (equivalent here to
the fair market value of the asset at the date-of-distribution). 4
.. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1014.1 O Id. §§ 1001, 1011.107 Id. § 2031.
188 Id. § 2032.
."'See CAsNER 810-12; R. CovEY, THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND THE
UsE OF FORMULA PROVISIONs 85-88 (1966); Treas. Reg. § 20.2032 (1962).
IN TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1222.
1
,tId. § 1223.
142 Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Suisman v.
Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113 (D.C. Conn. 1935), aff'd sub nom., Suisman v.
Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 573 (1936); Sherman Ewing v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 912 (1939);
Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 Cum. BULl. 286; Rev. Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 Cum.
BULL. 325; Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4(a)(3) (1961); notes 13-18 supra and
accompanying text.
1' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1014(a), -(b) (1), 2031, 2032; notes 135-
39 supra and accompanying text.
" Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Suisman v.
Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113 (D.C. Conn. 1935), aff'd sub nom., Suisman v. Hart-
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Absent consideration of the superimposed mandate of the Pro-
cedure by way of applicable state law, the defective pecuniary interest
language employing federal estate tax values for distribution pur-
poses was not viewed as creating a fixed dollar amount, and it there-
fore circumvented the attendant gains and losses problem. 4 ' Now,
the relevant inquiry is whether any one of the three techniques alters
the bequest in such a manner that it becomes, in effect, a "fixed and
definite 'dollar amount.'"
"Equal To"
This appears to be the result under the "equal to" method. Al-
though the fiduciary maintains his discretion to select any assets us-
ing federal estate tax values for distribution purposes under the in-
strument's provisions, he nevertheless is required to choose assets
the aggregate date-of-distribution values of which are equal to
the marital bequest. Therefore, clearly a "fixed and definite 'dollar
amount' " must be satisfied, and gains and losses to the estate will be
recognized by distributions to beneficiaries.' 46 However, the problem
ford-Connecticut Trust Co., 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
573 (1936) ; note 142 supra.
'" See FARR 294-95; Cox, Types of Marital Deduction Formula Clauses,
N.Y.U. 15TH INST. oN FED. TAX. 909, 930-32 (1957); Geller, Revenue
Procedure 64-19: "Variable Pecuniary Bequests," N.Y.U. 23RD INST. ON FED.
TAX. 1157, 1161 & n.23, 1164 (1965) ; Polasky 816-17, 865-67.
'.See Covey, Statutory Panacea for 64-19f: Existing and Proposed
Remedies for Marital Deduction Problem, 104 TRuSTS & ESTATES 69, 70(1965); Note, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction--Revenue Procedure
64-19, 41 IND. L.J. 711, 724 (1966).
A recently enacted statute in New York poses an interesting question
regarding income tax liability to the estate when assets are distributed to
beneficiaries. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 17-f. According to the statute, the
fiduciary must distribute assets the aggregate date-of-distribution of which
is "no less than . . ." the marital bequest. Id. § 17-f(2)(b). However, a
limiting instruction to the fiduciary is added: "and to the extent practicable
to no more than.. ." the marital bequest. Id. (emphasis added). This lan-
guage appears to allow the fiduciary to deviate from the "equal to" amount
within the confines of the terminology "practicable." However, will this
apparent statutory tolerance for varying aggregate date-of-distribution
values between the "equal to" amount and an unknown amount dictated by
the word "practicable" make the bequest not one for a "fixed and definite
'dollar amount,"' thereby hopefully avoiding gains and losses to the estate
via distributed assets? The answer is by no means clear, and to date
two commentators have come to opposite conclusions. In support of the theory
that income tax liability is circumvented, one commentator has stated: "It is
submitted that the statute allows the fiduciary broad powers of distribution
as to the maximum value of assets used to satisfy the marital share .... He
could distribute assets that have increased substantially in value without con-
travening the statute. Therefore, the eventual bequest is not ascertainable
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is mostly one of bookkeeping, and not income tax liability. Spe-
cifically, since the aggregate assets must have both federal estate tax
values and date-of-distribution values equal to the marital bequest,
the gains and losses are merely balanced off against each other.
147
However, there are three situations 'where this equality might not
be attained. First, the balancing process will be foreclosed in the
majority of instances when a trust is involved. Specifically, deduc-
tions for losses are not allowed on transfers between the fiduciary
of either an inter vivos trust or a testamentary trust and the trust's
beneficiaries, and transfers between two trusts which have a com-
mon grantor. 48 Secondly, ideal balancing will be unavailable where
the gains and losses vary between ones that are long term and
ones that are short term. 4 Thirdly, where all the estate's assets have
depreciated and no conversion to cash is required, the aggregate basis
of the distributed assets will exceed the aggregate date-of-distribution
values. However, in this instance, the estate will have a capital
loss."O Therefore, except when a trust is involved, the income tax
liability under the "equal to" technique appears to be of slight, if
any, consequence.
"Net Appreciation-Depreciation!"
Distributions of in-kind assets under the "net appreciation-
depreciation" method should not result in recognition of gains and
until distribution which means that the bequest is not in satisfaction of a
fixed dollar amount. In conclusion, the answer to the question must be that
no capital gain is incurred by the estate." Comment, Marital Deduction Pe-
cuniary Formula Bequests: Revenue Procedure 64,19 and N.Y. Personal
Property Law § 17-f, 30 AiANY L. REv. 262, 271 "(1966). In rebuttal, the
second author has declared: "I disagree with the commentator's interpreta-
tion of the word 'practicable' and believe the fiduciary must minimize the
'value' of the legacy insofar as he is able to do so, with the result that capital
gain should be realized. These differences of views indicate the unfortunate
ambiguity in the statute." R. CovEY, supra note 139, at 19 (Supp. 1967).
14. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1222.
.' Id. § 267; CASNER 98-101 (Supp. 1967); Edwards 261 n.21; Estate
of Ruth Hanna, 37 T.C. 63 (1961), rev'd sub nor., Estate of Ruth Hanna v.
Commissioner, 320 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1963). Moreover, the effect of non-
deductible losses where a trust is involved is greatly lessened when the com-
bined taxes of the trust and the beneficiaries are considered. When the re-
recipient disposes of the asset, gain is recognized only to the extent that such
gain exceeds the previously non-deductible loss. INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 267(d).219 Id. § 1222.
If a trust is involved, the loss usually will be non-deductible. Id. § 267.
See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
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losses to the estate. 5 The nature of the defective pecuniary interest
bequest should not be changed by the relevant state law in a manner
that creates a bequest of a fixed monetary sum. Because the value
of the estate will fluctuate under economic pressures, the technique's
requirement that assets be "fairly representative of appreciation or
depreciation" precludes calculation of a "fixed and definite 'dollar
amount' " until distribution date. However, and ironically, this
development has precipitated the question of whether this capability
of ascertaining the dollar value of the surviving spouse's claim at
distribution date results in distributions being made in satisfaction
of a fixed and definite monetary sum, with attendant income tax
liability. In this regard, one particular case should not be overlooked.
In Commissioner v. Brinckerhoff,152 the testatrix instructed the
fiduciary to convert certain in-kind assets to cash and to distribute
the resulting proceeds to four named beneficiaries. Instead, the
fiduciary distributed the in-kind assets to the beneficiaries, who
thereupon released the fiduciary from any claim of breach of the
instrument's directive. The court noted, among other things, that
the satisfaction of the beneficiaries' claims for cash payments with
in-kind assets was "a taxable transaction in which gain or loss of
the estate is to be recognized to the extent of the difference between
the estate's basis and the value of the cash liability satisfied."'' 3 The
court reasoned that the in-kind distribution satisfied the beneficiaries'
definite claim, acknowledging the fact that the exact dollar value of
the claim would have been ascertainable only after the fiduciary made
... Covey, supra note 146, at 70; Stevens, How to Draft Marital Deduc-
tion Formuda Clauses Under New Rev. Proc. 64-19, 20 J. TAX. 352, 354
(1964); The Internal Revenue Service Position on Marital Deduction
Clauses: Revenue Ruling 64-19, 46 CHX. B. RECORD 5, 19 (1964). In response
to a question concerning the income tax liability under the "net appreciation-
depreciation" technique, an official of the IRS stated: "[T]he dispositive
marital deduction clause of the decedent's will is treated as if it were a frac-
tional bequest. In a fractional bequest, unlike a pecuniary bequest, there is
no debt, therefore no gain or loss." Rogovin, supra note 118, at 434. Accord,
Gradwohl, Marital Deduction "Viewed as at the Date of the Decedent's
Death," 45 NEE. L. RYv. 457, 461 (1966); Smith, New Marital Deduction
Rie and Post October 1, 1964 Wills, 37 Wis. B. BuLL., Oct. issue, 7, 12
(1964). But see Colson, The Marital Deduction and Revenue Procedure
64-19, 10 Pn~c. LAw 69, 76 (Oct. 1964).
'* 168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948), aff'g 8 T.C. 1045 (1947). See also
Wilson v. Tomlinson, 306 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1962); Lindsay C. Howard,
23 T.C. 962 (1955).
253 168 F.2d at 440.
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the conversion to cash.154 In reaching its decision, the court made
the disturbing statement: "The fact that the ultimate value realized
by the taxpayers in the present case depends upon the fluctuating
value of the property devised to the executors does not affect our
conclusion .... ""' The adjudication might be susceptible of a
broad interpretation: whenever the definite dollar amount of a
beneficiary's claim can be ascertained at distribution date, satisfac-
tion of such claim with appreciated property will cause recognition
of income tax gain to the estate. 5 ' However, it is hoped that the
case will be limited to its specific facts.
"No Less Than"
The "no less than" method should not alter the pecuniary interest
bequest in a manner by which gains and losses are recognized on in-
kind distributions to beneficiaries. 157  By merely specifying the
minimum or "floor" amount of aggregate date-of-distribution
values, this technique does not establish the surviving spouse's claim
as a "fixed and definite 'dollar amount.'" Therefore, absent a local
law demanding proportional sharing, the fiduciary will have the
discretion to vary the aggregate distribution-date values ultimately
"4A tax liability however arose against the executors when the stock
was transferred to the taxpayers in exchange for a release of their claims
as legatee-beneficiaries to the cash proceeds which the executors would
have realized had they instead exercised the mandatory power of sale
given them under the will ....
It is argued that the ... [Kenan and Suisnan] decisions . . . do not
apply because they involved only cash legacies of fixed amounts and the
executor in such cases had control of the general estate which fluctuated
in value in his hands while the legatee was unaffected in the amount of
his recovery by the fluctuations. But the facts here involve no legal dis-
tinction since the taxpayers had no interest in the real estate during the
period of its increase in value but only in such cash as they might receive
from the exercise of the executors' power of sale.... The present case
is therefore to be distinguished not from other legacies which are of a
fixed amount in cash but from gifts under a will of property which be-
longs as such to the legatee.
Id.
Id.
" See Edwards 269; Polasky 809, 868-70.
157 See Covey, supra note 146, at 70; Edwards 262; Gradwohl, supra. note
151, at 461; Polasky 827-28, 867-68. But see Lloyd 898, 900; Sugarman,
"Pecuniary Formula" Marital Deduction Bequests: Application of Revenue
Procedure 64-19, 16 W. Rzs. L. Rav. 257, 275 (1965) ; Wright, The Marital
Deduction Since Revenue Procedure 64-19, 106 TRusTs & ESTATES 101, 105
(1967).
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received by the surviving spouse above the "floor" amount,""8 so
long as he satisfies the instrument's directive that federal estate tax
values of the distributed assets equal the marital bequest. Further-
more, without the benefit of a proportional sharing local law, the ra-
tionale of Brinckerhoff"' should have no effect on the "no less than"
approach where a fixed monetary sum does not exist.100
Revenue Procedure 64-19 assumes a neutral position in regard
to the effect its mandates might have on the estate's income tax
liability when in-kind assets are distributed, stating: "This Revenue
Procedure does not relate to any issue arising under the income tax
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.""" Although some might
gather comfort from this declaration, 16 2 others believe it signals a
close scrutiny in the future of the practice whereby income tax gains
to the estate are avoided by using federal estate tax values for dis-
tribution purposes.'3 If the warning is accurate, the future income
tax liability of the three techniques is uncertain. However, until
then, the gains problem appears least troublesome under the "no
less than" and "net appreciation-depreciation" methods, with the
latter possessing greater vulnerability due to the Brinckerhoff de-
cision.
3. Income Tax Consequences to Surviving Spouse
Distributions pursuant to any one of the three techniques should
not result in gain or loss to the surviving spouse. Although a
"' It has been contended that a certain amount of gain might be recog-
nized on the theory that the mandatory "floor" coupled with the fiduciary's
discretion to exceed this minimum results in a transfer which is "in part a
sale and in part a gift" within the purview of Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (e) (1)
(1961). CASNER 664-65 (Supp. 1967). Moreover, it is suggested that the loss
should be allowed when the distribution date value is less than the basis.
See R. Covny, supra note 139, at 22 n.76a (Supp. 1967). But see Gradwohl,
supra note 151, at 461 n.3; Polasky 867. A pecuniary bequest, designed to
avoid all problems of gain, has been suggested whereby assets are valued for
distribution purposes at the lower of federal estate tax values or date-of-
distribution values. See Covey, supra note 124, at 324; Dane, Marital De-
duction Questions: Three Current Tax Issues and Suggested Solutions, 103
TRUSTS & ESTATES 112, 114 (1964).
... For a discussion of the Brinckerhoff case, see text accompanying notes
152-6 supra.
... See Polasky 870.
... Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.02, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682, 684.
1 One official of the IRS has stated: "The Service is not considering
any modification or additions to the Revenue Procedure to cover income tax
consequences." Rogovin, supra note 118, at 434.
.1. See Covey, supra note 124, at 326; The Internal Revenue Service
Position on Marital Deduction Clauses: Revenue Rding 64-19, 46 Cii. B.
REcoRD 5, 12 (1964).
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"fixed and definite 'dollar amount'" is created by the "equal to"
method, satisfaction of this claim will result in a funded marital
share exactly equalling that sum to which the surviving spouse was
entitled.' As noted previously, the "no less than" and "net ap-,
preciation-depreciation" techniques probably will not be construed
as establishing a fixed monetary sum. Therefore, distributions will
not be in the form of a "sale or exchange," as the surviving spouse
is merely receiving an amount determined by the fiduciary in ac-
cordance with the instrument's provisions"0 5 The "net appreciation-
depreciation" approach does not give the surviving spouse a claim
to particular assets.'0 6 Consequently, receipt of any assets cannot be7
considered as the concurrent relinquishment by the surviving spouse
of a claim to other assets; thus, there is no theory of taxable "ex-
change" upon which to assess gains and losses-1 7 Furthermore,
even assuming the rationale of Brinckerhoff should be found ap-
plicable to the "net appreciation-depreciation" method,"" the resulting
"fixed and definite 'dollar amount' " at distribution date would not
result in gain or loss being charged to the marital share. In this
situation, as with the "equal to" approach, funding the claim will
cause the surviving spouse to receive exactly that to which he (she):
was entitled.
Nonetheless, any distributions under the three techniques must
be viewed in light of §§ 661-62 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. These sections declare that a distribution, to the extent that it
represents "distributable net income" to the estate," 9 will qualify as
a deduction to the estate and must be included in the gross income of
the beneficiary. 7° An exclusion is provided for "any amount which,
"' See generally Polasky 860-61.
... See Edwards 268; Polasky 865-68.
'"See notes 83-84, 93-94 supra and accompanying text.
'"Some authorities have advanced the theory that when a beneficiary has
a claim to particular assets and consents to receipt of other assets in-satisfac-
tion of such claim, the result might be viewed as a taxable exchange to the
consenting beneficiary. See CASNER 804-05, 807; Peeler, Unsuspected Reali-
zation of Profit in Estates and Trusts, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1191, 1193
(1959). But see Butala, Administrative Problems Involving Marital De-
duction. Gifts, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 290, 296-97 (1965).
... For a discussion of the Brinckerhoff case, see text accompanying
notes 152-6 supra.
... For the definition of "distributable net income," see INT. REV. CODE of:
1954, § 643(a).
"" See generally CASNER 77-92; R. COVEY, supra note 139, at 33-37;
FARR 249-55; INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 102; Rev. Rul. 64-314, 1964-2
Cum. BULL. 167; Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 286.
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under the terms of the governing instrument, is properly paid or
credited as a gift or bequest of a specific sum of money or of specific
property and which is paid or credited all at once or in not more than
3 installments."'1 Although fulfilling the requisite of "in not more
than 3 installments" normally will not pose a problem,172 the three
techniques will not qualify under the exclusion as "a gift or bequest
of a specific sum of money or of specific property." To so qualify,
the specific monetary sum or property "must be ascertainable under
the terms of a testator's will as of the date of his death, or under the
terms of an intervivous [sic] trust instrument as of the date of the
inception of the trust."'' 3
The Service has stated that under a formula pecuniary interest
bequest, the amount is not ascertainable at the required time because
the final calculations of the adjusted gross estate can be made only
after determination of funeral expenses, debts, and administrative
expenses, the fiduciary's possible selection of the alternate valuation
date, and his decision to treat particular deductions as either estate
tax or income deductions.' 4 As to non-formula pecuniary interest
bequests, the ascertainment of the specific sum at the requisite time
is impossible under the "no less than" and "net appreciation-deprecia-
tion" methods, where federal estate tax values are used to comply
with the instrument's provisions and the techniques themselves
impose no fixed dollar amount at the testator's death or the inception
of the inter vivos trust. 7 5 However, it is arguable that a non-
formula pecuniary interest bequest using federal estate tax values
for distribution purposes, when coupled with the "equal to" tech-
nique, does qualify under the exclusion. Although the specific sum
is not ascertainable under the terms of the instrument, the super-
...1NT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 663(a)(1).
.72 If the will does not specify time of payment, the bequest is construed
by the Regulations to be payable in one installment. Treas. Reg. §§
1.663 (a)-i (a), 1.663 (a)-1 (c) (1961) ; see CASNER 84-85.
""Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(b)(1) (1961). Consequently, although
satisfaction of a bequest which creates a "fixed and definite 'dollar amount'"
will result in recognized gain to the estate when appreciated assets are
distributed, the distribution nevertheless will cause "distributable net income"
to be included in the beneficiary's gross income. Id. The Service has ex-
plicitly declared that "a specific sum of money" qualifying under the ex-
clusion provision is different from a "fixed and definite 'dollar amount'" creat-
ing income tax liability to the estate. Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 Cum. BULL.
286; see Stevens, supra note 70, at 950.
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(b)(1) (1961); Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1
Cum. BULL. 286; CASNER 86-87.
. See text accompanying notes 151-60 supra.
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imposed "equal to" mandate does result in a fixed monetary sum at
the specified time.'17 Therefore, it might be contended that an in-
strument containing a -non-formula bequest, when viewed in light
of relevant state law, does designate a specific sum and that a dis-
tribution should not carry with it "distributable net income." Ab-
sent this possible exception, distributions under the three techniques
will give the estate a deduction and must be included in the gross
income of the beneficiary, to the extent of the "distributable net
income."
A beneficiary's gross income might also be augmented with the
interest payment from the estate occasioned by the fiduciary's delay
in satisfying the bequest. 7 This distribution will not fall within the
exclusion to §§ 661-62, because it does not represent a specific sum
that was ascertainable at the testator's death or at the inception of an
inter vivos trust. 78 This potential enhancement of a beneficiary's
gross income is a pertinent consideration in regard to the surviving
spouse who normally has a claim not only to rapid payment but also
to a preference in order of payment.'79
4. Basis of Asset to Surviving Spouse
Because every distribution might represent to some extent
"distributable net income," the calculation of basis to the distributee
under the three techniques should be made with this factor in mind.8
The Regulations' 8 ' and Revenue Ruling 64-314"82 detail the man-
ner by which the inclusion of "distributable net income" will result
in an altered basis of each asset to the distributee. With this aside,
the following comments will focus on the determination of basis
'"See text accompanying note 146 mpra.1
"See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
INT. Rnv. CODE Of 1954, § 663(a)(1); see CASNER 86-88, 92; R.
Covwy, supra note 139, at 37; Polasky 861 & n.171.
U0 See notes 97-8 supra and accompanying text.180 See generally CASNER 96-98 (Supp. 1967); R. CovEY, supra note 3, at
35-36; Edwards 257 & n.14.
.
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(f) (3) (1965).
The basis of the property in the hands of the beneficiary is its fair market
value at the time it was paid, credited, or required to be distributed, to
the extent such value is included in the gross income of the beneficiary.
To the extent that the value of property distributed in kind is not in-
cluded in the gross income of the beneficiary, its basis in the hands of the
beneficiary is governed by the rules in sections 1014 and 1015 and the
regulations thereunder...
Id.
182 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 167.
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vis-A-vis distributions to the marital share which do not represent
"distributable net income," a circumstance sometimes created by
either the instrument's directives or state law.
The treatment accorded the pecuniary interest bequest using
date-of-distribution values for distribution purposes183 should de-
termine the issue of basis to the surviving spouse of assets funded
under the "equal to" method. The relevant parallelism is the fact
that both create a claim for a fixed monetary sum, satisfaction of
which is construed as a "sale or exchange." 84 Therefore, in funding
the marital share's claim, the surviving spouse should receive assets
with a basis equal to their fair market value at date of distribution. 8
Under the "equal to" approach, it should be remembered that the
detrimental effect of non-recognition of losses from a "sale or ex-
change" in the majority of distributions dealing with trusts can be
mollified under the rule that gain on the subsequent disposal of an
asset by the distributee-beneficiary will be realized only to the ex-
tent the gain exceeds the previous loss.'8 6
Distributions to the marital share under the "no less than" and
"net appreciation-depreciation" techniques should not be viewed as
a "sale or exchange" in satisfaction of a fixed dollar amount.
187
Consequently, the basis to the surviving spouse should be the basis
of the asset to the estate.'88 This value will be determined by either
the fair market value at the date of the decedent's death'8" or the
alternate valuation date.' 90 Therefore, where the surviving spouse
receives an appreciated asset, subsequent disposition will result in
greater gain due to the perpetuation of the estate's basis. However,
if the asset is not "sold" before the surviving spouse's death, then
the asset in the second estate will receive a stepped-up basis'' equal
"' See generally CASNER 82 (Supp. 1967) ; Peeler, supra note 167; Smith,
supra note 151, at 12.
1. See Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Rev. Rul.
56-270, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 325; Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4(a)(3) (1961);
notes 17, 142-44, 146 supra and accompanying text.
185 See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1014; Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4(a) (3)
(1961); Polasky 861, 874-76 & nn.226-27.
... INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 267; note 148 supra and accompanying
text.
18See notes 151-52, 157-60 supra and accompanying text.
18 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1014; see CASNER, 816; Polasky 868, 875-76
& n.227; Smith, supra note 151, at 12.
... INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2031.
1"0 Id. § 2032.
191 Id. § 1014.
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to the fair market value at the date of the surviving spouse's death.9
or the alternate valuation date, 9 ' thereby avoiding gain recognized
to either the first estate or the surviving spouse. This flexibility is
unavailable with the "equal to" method where the surviving spouse
must assume as basis the date-of-distribution value of the asset.
Likewise, if the rationale of Brinckerhoff should be found ap-
plicable to the "net appreciation-depreciation" approach,'9 4 then the
basis to the surviving spouse will be the date-of-distribution's fair
market value.' 5
5. Charitable Remainder Deduction
In estate tax planning, frequently a pertinent inquiry is the de-
ductibility of charitable transfers. 9 Before a gift to charity will
be deductible from the decedent's gross estate, the charitable interest
must be "presently ascertainable."'9 7 While this valuation require-
ment can normally be fulfilled when dealing with specific bequests,
charitable remainder interests are often impossible to evaluate.98
Indeed, this result might be occasioned by a marital deduction distri-
bution plan.
The "equal to" technique should not prevent a charitable re-
mainder interest from being "presently ascertainable."'" The
fiduciary must fund the marital share with an exact amount and
does not have the discretionary power to alter the value of the re-
mainder interest by distributions above the "floor." Similarly, the
"net appreciation-depreciation" method should not bar ascertainment
of the charitable remainder.210 Although the final dollar amount
may fluctuate due to economic conditions, the surviving spouse's in-
terest is fixed and cannot be altered by the fiduciary in a manner that
will affect the remainder interest. The Service, however, will prob-
202 Id. § 2031.
1o2 Id. § 2032.
104 See notes 152-56 supra and accompanying text.
1"' Commissioner v. Brinckerhoff, 168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948), aff'g
8 T.C. 1045 (1947); Lindsay C. Howard, 23 T.C. 962 (1955).
... INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2055.
10 TTreas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(a) (1962).
See CASNER 897-920; FARR 268-70; J. LEWIS, THE ESTATE TAX 134-36
(Practising Law Institute, 1964) ; Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (1965).
"'
9 See Cantwell, Revenue Procedure 64-19: Statutory Relief, 104 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 953, 954 (1965) ; Covey, Statutory Panacea for 64-19f: Existing
and Proposed Remedies for Marital Deduction Problem, 104 TRusTs &
ESTATES 69, 70 (1965).
"'
0 See Covey, supra note 199, at 70.
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ably be successful in disallowing the charitable deduction under the
"no less than" technique.201 Absent a local law requiring proportional
sharing, the fiduciary's discretion to distribute assets in excess of the
"floor" represents a potential influence on the value of the remainder
interest, making it unascertainable and therefore nondeductible.
6. Post-Mortem Estate Planning
The degree of post-mortem estate planning possibly desired by
the decedent clearly will not be available by way of any one of the
three techniques. Indeed, herein lies the practical, if not technical,
reason for Revenue Procedure 64-19.202 Therefore, the germane
question is which method circumscribes this post-death flexibility
the least. Generally, the response will be the "no less than" approach.
Both the "equal to" and "net appreciation-depreciation" techniques
require the fiduciary's compliance with an exact amount which is
unalterable under the former method and is constantly fluctuating,
solely from the external influence of economics, under the latter
method. By comparison, so long as federal estate tax values of
distributed assets comport with the instrument's directives and a
proportional sharing local law does not exist, the fiduciary under the
"no less than" approach must satisfy only the mandatory "floor"
but can choose to exceed this minimum. 03 This latitude allows the
fiduciary greater flexibility in influencing estate and income tax con-
sequences to, and the "most attractive" distribution plan for, the
testator's estate, the surviving spouse's estate, and all beneficiaries. 20 4
20 See R. CovEy, THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND THE USE OF FORMULA
PRovisioNs 51, 58 (1966); Edwards 263.
'o2 See Sugarman, supra note 157, at 260-61.
20 One frequently reads the statement: "Under the 'no less than' re-
quirements, there is a 'floor' but no 'ceiling."' See Covey, supra note 199,
at 70; Comment, Drafting Solutions to Rev. Proc. 64-19, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J.
517, 523 (1965); Note, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction--Revenue Pro-
cedure 64-19, 41 IND. L.J. 711, 721 (1966). However, there is a very real
limitation on the "ceiling" of aggregate distribution date value of distributed
assets. To comply with the instrument's directives, these assets funding the
marital share must have an aggregate federal estate tax valuation exactly
equal to the marital bequest. The interaction of the twin valuation mandates
does result in a "ceiling." See notes 106-14 supra and accompanying text.
.o For discussions of various aspects of post-mortem estate planning, see
generally Garrett, Post-Mortem Estate Planning: Taxwise Administration
Can Reduce Overall Imposts, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1194 (1959); Laikin,
Your Estate Plan: Taxes-Life Insurance-Trusts, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES
98 (1965) ; Stevens, How Post-Mortem Estate Planning Can Reduce Income
and Estate Taxes, 21 J. TAx. 288 (1964).
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Even though dissection of every conceivable estate vis-A-vis the
three techniques is impossible, a few general comments hopefully
will highlight the relative merits of each method, assuming a general
appreciation in the estate's assets unless otherwise indicated. Fur-
thermore, it should not be forgotten that in implementing any one of
the three approaches, there are various elections available to the fidu-
ciary by which he may influence the distribution plan : 1 (1) select-
ing certain deductions, such as administrative expenses,208 as either
income 0" or estate0 8 tax deductions; (2) deciding whether accrued
income on certain non-interest-bearing obligations will be taken on
the estate's final income tax return ;29 and (3) choosing the valua-
tion date as either the date of the decedent's death210 or the alternate
valuation date.211 The ensuing discussion will be made within this
general framework.
... See generally CovEY, supra note 201, at 78-92; Browne, Effect of
Elections by an Executor upon the Estate and upon the Beneficiaries, N.Y.U.
23RD INST. ON FED. TAX. 1239 (1965); Butala, mspra note 167, at 297-99.
... Presently, even though the size of the marital deduction may be altered
by claiming administrative expenses as income tax deductions, the Service
nevertheless will honor the entire claim for the marital deduction. Rev. Rul.
55-643, 1955-2 Cum!. BULL. 386; Rev. Rul. 55-225, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 460.
This position may be subject to attack because of the recent case of Jackson
v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964), where the Court concluded that
"terminability of an interest for purposes of the marital deduction must be
viewed at the instant of the decedent's death." Cohen, Treasury Views on
Current Questions, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 9, 10 (1965). An official of the
Service has indicated that any change in its present stance regarding claim-
ing administrative expenses as income tax deductions will be prospective
in application. Rogovin, The Sound and the Fury: Official Views on Revenue
Procedure 64-19, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 432, 435 (1965).
'
1 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 212.
=OS Id. § 2053.
... Id. § 454(a).210 Id. § 1014.
... Id. § 2032; see Blattmachr, Choosing Optional Valuation Date, 99
TRUSTS & ESTATES 714 (1960) ; Butala, supra note 167, at 298-99; Comment,
Choosing a Marital Deduction Formula Clause, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 532, 535-36
(1961). One official of the IRS has raised the possibility that the marital
deduction will be adversely affected, in whole or in part, when the alternate
valuation date may be selected because with this contingency it cannot be said
that the surviving spouse's interest vests as required at the time of the de-
cedent's death. Reiling, Revenue Procedure 64-19: Rethinking Marital
Deduction Clauses, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 905-06 (1964). Observing that
this conclusion originated from a discussion regarding post-mortem manipu-
lation objectionable under Revenue Procedure 64-19, one commentator has
retorted: "To equate the existence of a statutory election provided by the
Code with tinkering based on artful draftsmanship is an extraordinary
step." Browne, supra note 205, at 1247. Accord, CAsNER 633-36 (Supp.
1967); Polasky 884 n.273; Straus, Revenue Procedure 64-19: When Should
Agreements Be Made? 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 911 (1964).
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The total tax consequences to the decedent's estate, the surviving
spouse's estate, and all beneficiaries can be more effectively deter-
mined under the "no less than" method. First, the fiduciary pos-
sesses a potential tax savings device with the basis of assets to the
distributee equalling the estate's basis.2 12 Because date-of-distribu-
tion values may exceed the "floor," the proximity of an asset's basis
to its fair market value at distribution date can be more freely se-
lected after various questions are answered. How much gain or loss
recognized on subsequent disposal of assets should be postponed by
a generation? In light of progressive rates, which of the bene-
ficiaries should realize how much potential gain or loss? Who should
receive presently appreciated assets which probably will depreciate,
and vice versa?"'3 What possibility is there that the surviving
spouse's death is imminent so as to provide a credit to the second
estate for previously taxed property?2. 4 Which distributable assets
is the surviving spouse most likely to retain and thus qualify for a
stepped up basis at death ?2' What are the needs of the surviving
spouse in relation to the other beneficiaries?
The manipulative vehicle-basis of asset to distributee is the
estate's basis-is present under the "net appreciation-depreciation"
technique,21 " assuming the rationale of Brinckerhoff is found in-
applicable. However, because the fiduciary must focus on the "fairly
representative" mandate requiring an exact sum at final distribution,
he has less opportunity to control which assets will go to the spouse
based on the disparity between their basis and fair market value.
Under the "equal to" method, favorable postponement of gains
and losses is foreclosed, with the asset's basis to the distributee
being its fair market value at distribution date. However, as
noted previously, this hopefully will be only a bookkeeping task
of balancing.1 If not, the capital gain to the estate normally
results from forced sales necessitated by twin valuation require-
ments. If substantial depreciation occurs, the structure of the
estate's assets can be shifted back somewhat to the "norm" by se-
lecting the alternate valuation date and making distributions shortly
..
1 2 See notes 187-93 supra and accompanying text.213 See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2013.
1I TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014; see notes 191-93 supra and accom-
panying text.
... See notes 187-93 mspra and accompanying text.
" See notes 146-50 supra and accompanying text.
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thereafter.21 8 If this election is rejected, the fiduciary merely trans-
fers the potential losses to the beneficiaries under the "no less than"
and "net appreciation-depreciation" techniques. With the "equal to"
method, the estate realizes the losses, probably losing the tax savings
because of lack of offsetting gains.
The income tax liability from forced sales occasioned by the
twin valuation mandates is less severe with the "no less than" ap-
proach." 9 Forced reductions to cash are precipitated more fre-
quently by the "equal to" and "net appreciation-depreciation"
methods where an exact amount must be funded the marital share.
The quantities of conversions necessitated by the three techniques
under varying economic conditions have been explored previously.220
However, regarding total tax consequences, two factors deserve
highlighting. The lack of an exact sum requirement under the "no
less than" approach allows the fiduciary to achieve the most favor-
able interaction between conversions to cash and the basis of assets
to the distributee. With attention to progressive rates, the fiduciary
can decide if it is better for the estate to realize the gain or loss
through "sale" or to allow the income tax consequences to be de-
termined by the subsequent actions of the beneficiaries. 1 Secondly,
when there is substantial depreciation, the above-mentioned interac-
tion can be analyzed in light of the alternate valuation date.222
Again, these two considerations allow a greater range for discretion
under the "no less than" method. 21
The last major tax inquiry concerns the ultimate amount to be
funded the surviving spouse, which sum can increase the estate taxes
on the second estate. In this regard, the weakness of the "net ap-
preciation-depreciation" technique is readily apparent. Beside the
fiduciary electives which may affect the marital share, economic
factors alone will dictate the exact amount that is "fairly repre-
sentative." '224 Because we are living in an age of inflation, this
1
' See Covzy, supra note 201, at 85-88; Covey, The Marital Deduction:
Revenue Procedure 64-19 and Formula Provisions, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 317, 325(1964).
See notes 106-14, 130-35 supra and accompanying text.
2
.
0 See notes 106-14, 130-35 supra and accompanying text.
'
2 See generally Polasky 874-76.
2' See notes 211, 218 supra and accompanying text.
"'See Covey, supra note 218, at 324-25; Polasky 885-86.
"'See Weinstock, The Marital Deduction--Problems and Answers
Under Revenue Procedure 64-19, 43 TAxEs 340, 346 (1965); Note, 'The
Estate Tax Marital Deduction-Revenue Procedure 64-19, 41 IND. L.J. 711,
721-22 (1966).
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method could easily result in undesirable overfunding of the mari-
tal share.225 The inflexibility created by an exact amount req-
uisite is also present with the "equal to" approach, except that
the surviving spouse's share cannot be overfunded when the es-
tate appreciates in value.220 The absence of forced overfunding
when there is general appreciation also is present with the "no less
than" approach. Furthermore, when general depreciation occurs,
relative overfunding under the latter two techniques22" might be
eliminated by election of the alternate valuation date.228
The greater control over total tax consequences available under
the "no less than" method becomes increasingly more significant
when viewed in connection with the interrelated decision as to which
assets should be distributed to particular beneficiaries. Attempted
avoidance of forced sales, pro-rata distributions, multivaluations
under any technique will inhibit the matching of certain assets with
specific beneficiaries. As noted earlier, these restraining forces are
most influential with the "net appreciation-depreciation" method,
and to a lesser extent with the "equal to" approach. 2 9 However, the
degree of fiduciary discretion under the "no less than" technique
provided by the allowance of distributions in excess of the "floor"
facilitates greater estate planning after the decedent's death.2 10
During this period, the needs of the surving spouse vis-a'-vis the
children-beneficiaries can be appraised. This inquiry is irrelevant
under the other two techniques where a mandatory exact amount
exists. Furthermore, the "no less than" flexibility allows increased
fiduciary attention to the determination of which assets have the
greatest income-producing potential, which are more susceptible
to ease in valuation, and which assets such as close corporate stock
and real estate should be funded in entirety to particular beneficiaries.
It appears clear that the permutations of asset selections are infinitely
greater under the "no less than" technique where the fiduciary does
not have the yoke of an exact amount requirement.
"'See Comment, Drafting Solutions to Rev. Proc. 64-19, 9 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 517, 524-25 (1965).2' See Note, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction--Revenue Procedure
64-19, 41 IND. L.J. 711, 724 (1966).
.2. See Hauser, Latest Developments in Taxation of Estates and Trusts
Raise New Caveats for Tax Men, 21 J. TAx. 32, 33 (1964).
2' See notes 211, 218 supra and accompanying text.
"8 See notes 104-35 supra and accompanying text.
23 See Polasky 830-32, 883-86.
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7. The Decedent's Intent
The last comparative area is the extent to which each of the
three techniques furthers the decedent's intentions. The inquiry has
been so phrased because it has long been clear that Revenue Pro-
cedure 64-19 forbids complete implementation of the decedent's
desires. The discussion will focus on six intentions in the order of
importance this author believes any decedent might have ranked
them.
First, the use of a formula bequest evidences a firm desire for
the estate to obtain the maximum marital deduction."' All three
methods fulfill this objective. This is true even under the "equal to"
and "no less than" approaches where there has been substantial de-
preciation and the aggregate date-of-distribution values are less than
the "floor." 2"2
Second, the decedent gave the fiduciary discretion to make in-
kind distributions for the purpose of avoiding forced conversions to
cash of all assets.2m There is parity among the three techniques in
this regard as each accomplishes this objective." 4 The decedent's
desire to limit forced sales to the "necessary" minimum will be
discussed subsequently in connection with ease of administering
the estate.235
Third, the grant to the fiduciary to use federal estate tax values
for distribution purposes signals the decedent's aim that income tax
gain to the estate not be recognized on distributions.1 6 Although
often gains and losses from distributions can be balanced off against
each other under the "equal to" method, it nevertheless appears that
normally net gain from either forced sales or in-kind distributions
will be recognized to the estate under this technique. The "net
appreciation-depreciation" approach should not frustrate this de-
"I See Note, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction--Revenue Procedure
64-19, 41 IND. L.J. 711, 718-19 (1966).
2. See authorities cited in note 111 supra.
"'2 See Report of Committee on Administration and Distribution of De-
cedent Estates, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 976, 984 (1965).
2" If the fiduciary does not have the power to make distributions in kind,
then the pecuniary interest bequest is not within the purview of the Pro-
cedure's mandates. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01(3) (b), 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682,
684; see note 41 supra and accompanying text.
... See notes 245-46 infra and accompanying text.
2" See Covey, supra note 199, at 69-70; Comment, Drafting Solutions
to Rev. Proc. 64-19, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 517, 526 (1965); Report of Con-
mittee on Administration and Distribution of Decedent Estates, 104 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 976, 984 (1965).
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cedent's desire unless the rationale of Brinckerhoff is invoked.2 17
Notwithstanding this adjudication, in-kind distributions under the
"no less than" method should not result in gain or loss to the
estate." 8 Although one cannot be absolutely certain of future ju-
dicial interpretation of these three new hybrid bequests, " the "no
less than" technique seemingly is the safest choice for guaranteeing
the avoidance of gain or loss to the estate from in-kind distributions.
Fourth, the decedent did not want the amount ultimately funded
the surviving spouse to be fortuitiously determined by fluctuations
in the estate due solely to economic factors.240 One might contend
that if the decedent had thought about it, he would have wanted the
surviving spouse to participate in the estate's appreciation or de-
preciation. The obvious retort, which has been mentioned by others,
is that the decedent did consider this alternative, rejected it, and
instead selected the pecuniary bequest.24' Therefore, it is possible
that the "net appreciation-depreciation" technique subverts the de-
cedent's desire to avoid proportional sharing.
Fifth, the decedent desired to grant the fiduciary maximum dis-
cretion in determining the dollar amount ultimately funded the sur-
viving spouse so long as the maximum marital deduction was ob-
tained. This statement is uncontrovertible as the defective pecuniary
interest bequest language designates federal estate tax values for
distribution purposes. The important issue is what are the reason-
able inferences from this grant regarding the extent to which the
decedent wished the fiduciary to use the discretionary power. Some
might contend that the decedent's prime objective was to give the
surviving spouse an exact amount as evidenced by the selection of a
pecuniary bequest.2 42 This argument would deemphasize the testa-
tor's selection of federal estate tax values for distribution purposes,
28 For discussion of the Brinckerhoff case, see notes 152-54 supra and
accompanying text.
... See notes 157-60 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 161-64 supra.
.
0 See CovEy, supra; note 201, at 44; Comment, Marital Deduction. Pe-
ciuziary Formula Bequests: Revenue Procedure 64-19 and N.Y. Personal
Property Law § 17-f, 30 ALBANy L. REv. 262, 270 (1966).See Cantwell, sapra note 199, at 954.
242 See Cantwell, supra note 199, at 954; Lindsay, Marital Deduction Will
Clauses, 39 FLA. B.J. 1068, 1072 (1965) ; Comment, Marital Deduction, Pe-
cuniary Formula Bequests: Revenue Procedure 64-19 and N.Y. Personal
Property Law § 17-f, 30 ALBANY L. REV. 262, 270 (1966).
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on the ground that this choice was made merely to avoid income tax
gain to the estate on in-kind distributions. Although this reasoning
is plausible, a more realistic inference would appear to be that the de-
cedent did desire the fiduciary to use his discretion to determine the
amount of the marital share, taking into consideration developments
occurring after the decedent's death. It is highly arguable, if not
indeed inescapable, that the decedent envisioned the ideal amount
funded the marital share as a sum ascertained by the fiduciary after
appraising the relative needs of the beneficiaries, estate and income
tax advantages of various distribution plans, and general estate
planning considerations.'s Indeed, the raison d'etre of this strat-
egy-funding the surviving spouse the least amount of assets neces-
sary to obtain the maximum marital deduction-is what provoked
the Procedure itself. Although this underfunding is no longer avail-
able, some post-mortem manipulation is possible under the "no less
than" technique. For this reason, this method sustains as much as
possible the decedent's directive of fiduciary discretion, regardless
of the inarticulated motivations.
Sixth, the use of federal estate tax values for distribution pur-
poses and the provision for in-kind distributions clearly demon-
strates the decedent's desire to realize two objectives: (1) distribu-
tions made in terms of income and estate tax consequences to the
decedent's estate, the surviving spouse's estate, and all bene-
ficiaries; and (2) the interrelated factor of implementing the
estate with relative administrative ease. In light of previous
discussion, it seems clear that the "no less than" technique comes
closest to accomplishing this testamentary intent, in terms of
forced sales, the manipulative tool of basis to the distributee,
combined taxes on the first and second estates, income tax gains
to the decedent's estate from in-kind distributions, and pro-rata
distributions. "4  Regarding total tax consequences, the "no less
than" method has the unfortunate feature of denying the estate
a deduction for the charitable remainder interest.24 5 However, po-
tential loss of this tax savings should not be determinative. Some
"' See Comment, Drafting Solutions to Rev. Proc. 64-19, 9 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 517, 526 (1965); Note, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction--Revenue
Procedure 64-19, 41 IND. L.J. 711, 718-19 (1966).
"' See Polasky 830-32, 871-85; notes 212-33 supra and accompanying text.
... See note 201 supra and accompanying text.
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estates will not involve gifts to charities. Furthermore, in the ma-
jority of cases where there is a charitable interest, it will be in the
form of a specific bequest which usually will be deductible. There-
fore, when emphasis is properly placed on the infrequency of the
charitable remainder and the total tax savings available to all
bequests subject to the "no less than" technique, the fear of non-
deductibility loses much of its influence.
A Choice
The appraisal of the three techniques vis-a-vis the decedent's
intent clearly exposes, if it was not therefore apparent, this author's
choice of the "no less than" method.246 However, the Achilles' heel
of this selection should not be overlooked. The "no less than" tech-
nique will produce very unfavorable results if adopted by a state
which also maintains a local law requiring proportional sharing.U7
The net result is that when there has been substantial depreciation in
the estate's value, the mandatory "floor" will prevent the surviving
spouse's participation in the depreciation aside from the employ-
ment of the alternate valuation date, thereby effectuating relative
overfunding of the second estate. Further, the surviving spouse
must share in appreciation, a result left to the fiduciary's discretion
under an untainted "no less than" statute. Consequently, this tech-
nique, when coupled with a local law demanding proportional shar-
ing, offers no additional advantages and eliminates the most attrac-
tive feature of the "net appreciation-depreciation" method. In sum,
if a state is to adopt a "no less than" statute, it should detail the
extent to which the fiduciary's discretion inherent in the "no less
than" technique will or will not be limited by the rule of imparti-
ality.24 This specificity will have the added advantage of discourag-
ing internecine family disputes.2 49
I" .Accord, Lloyd, Revenue Procedure 64-19: Background of Drafting
Problems, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 898, 900 (1964) ; Polasky 885-86. But see
Cantwell, Revenue Procedure 64-19: Statutory Relief, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES
953, 954 (1965); Note, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction--Revenue Pro-
cedure 64-19, 41 IND. L.J. 711, 723-24 (1966), where the "equal to" method is
advanced.247 See note 99 supra.
See Covey, Statutory Panacea for 64-19f: Existing and Proposed
Remedies for Marital Deduction Problems, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 69, 70
(1965).249 See notes 24, 100 supra and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
SUGGESTED MODEL STATUTE
Section 1. As used in the following sections of this act, the
terms "pecuniary bequest" and "transfer in trust of a pecuniary
amount" mean, respectively, a bequest in a last will and testament
or a transfer under a trust instrument of a specific amount of money,
which amount is either expressly stated in the instrument or de-
terminable by means of a formula which is stated in the instru-
ment. Whether a bequest or transfer in trust is pecuniary in char-
acter depends upon the intention of the testator or grantor.
Section 2. Whenever under a last will and testament or trust
instrument the executor, trustee or other fiduciary is allowed to, em-
powered to, authorized to or required by the terms of such instru-
ment to satisfy wholly or partly a pecuniary bequest (including a
pecuniary bequest in trust) or transfer in trust of a pecuniary amount,
to or for the benefit of a surviving spouse of a decedent, by dis-
tributing or allocating wholly or partly assets of the estate or trust
in kind at the values as finally determined for Federal estate tax
purposes, then the executor, trustee, or other fiduciary shall satisfy
such pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust of a pecuniary amount by
the distribution or allocation of assets, including cash, having an ag-
gregate fair market value at the date, or dates, of distribution or
allocation amounting to no less than the amount of the pecuniary
bequest or transfer in trust of a pecuniary amount as finally de-
termined for Federal estate tax purposes, unless the last will and
testament or trust instrument provides otherwise.
Section 3. A provision in a last will and testament or trust in-
strument that an executor, trustee or other fiduciary so allowed, em-
powered, authorized or required by its terms to satisfy wholly or
partly such pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust of a pecuniary
dmount with assets of the estate or trust in kind at the values as
finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes shall act fairly or
equitably or fairly equitably or not arbitrarily or not unreasonably
[or words of similar import] in satisfying such bequest or trans-
fer, shall be deemed, in the absence of clear provisions to the con-
trary, to be a direction to distribute or allocate assets, including
cash, fairly representative of appreciation or depreciation in the
value of all property thus available for distribution or allocation in
19681
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satisfaction of such pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust of a
pecuniary amount.
Section 4. Whenever there is a provision in a last will and
testament or trust instrument that an executor, trustee or other
fiduciary so allowed, empowered, authorized or required by its
terms to satisfy wholly or partly such pecuniary bequest or transfer
in trust of a pecuniary amount with assets of the estate or trust in
kind at the values as finally determined for Federal estate tax pur-
poses must or may, in satisfying such bequest or transfer, either:
(a) distribute or allocate assets, including cash, having an ag-
gregate fair market value at the date, or dates, of distribution or al-
location amounting to no less than the amount of the pecuniary
bequest or transfer in trust of a pecuniary amount as finally deter-
mined for Federal estate tax purposes, or
(b) distribute or allocate assets, including cash, fairly representa-
tive of appreciation or depreciation in the value of all property thus
available for distribution or allocation in satisfaction of such pe-
cuniary bequest or transfer in trust of a pecuniary amount, then,
the executor, trustee or other fiduciary nevertheless shall be re-
quired to follow the first alternative and shall be required to dis-
tribute or allocate assets, including cash, having an aggregate fair
market value at the date, or dates, of distribution or allocation
amounting to no less than the amount of the pecuniary bequest or
transfer in trust of a pecuniary amount as finally determined for
Federal estate tax purposes.
[Section 5. If, in an instrument which provides for a pecuniary
bequest or transfer in trust of a pecuniary amount, the executor,
trustee or other fiduciary is allowed to, empowered to, authorized to
or required to satisfy wholly or partly such bequest or transfer by a
distribution or allocation in kind, and the instrument is silent as to
the value to be given to assets distributed or allocated in kind, the
executor, trustee or other fiduciary shall satisfy such pecuniary be-
quest or transfer in trust of a pecuniary amount with assets valued
at their respective fair market values on the date, or dates, of their
distribution or allocation.]
Section 6. This act shall not be deemed to create any implication
of change in existing law, to invalidate any distribution in kind
actually made prior to the effective date of this act with respect to
which values other than herein specified were used, or to impose any
[Vol. 46
REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19
obligation or liability upon the executor, trustee or other fiduciary
by reason of any distribution in kind actually made prior to the
effective date of this act with respect to which values other than
herein specified were used.
Section 7. The provisions of this act are severable. If under any
circumstances any provision, part, sentence, paragraph, or section of
this act is declared invalid, unconstitutional or void, such declaration
shall not affect the part that remains nor impair its validity when
applied to other circumstances.
Section 8. This act shall be effective with respect to all last wills
and testaments and revocable intervivos trust instruments executed
or created before or after the effective date of this act by persons
who die [on or] after the effective date of this act, and to ir-
revocable intervivos trust instruments executed or created [on or]
after the effective date of this act.
Section 9. It has been found and hereby is declared by the Legis-
lative [or General] Assembly of the State of that
many residents of this State have executed last wills and testaments
and trust instruments in good faith believing such instruments to
qualify for the marital deduction for Federal estate tax purposes,
but which may not so qualify or may be deemed not to so qualify
(particularly by virtue of Revenue Procedure 64-19 issued by the
Internal Revenue Service as effective on October 1, 1964), at great
financial hazard and loss to their surviving spouses and estates,
and causing possible confusion and expense in the administration
of estates and that the enactment of this act hopefully will result
in curing such disqualifications in many cases. Therefore, an emer-
gency hereby is deemed to exist, and this act, being necessary for
the immediate preservation of the public peace, welfare and safety,
shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage [and
approval, or upon its otherwise becoming a law].
COMMENTS: The above suggested statute, which follows
primarily the relevant statute of the State of Arkansas (ARK. STAT.
ANN. 62-2909.1-.5 (Supp. 1967), contains a section and scattered
language in brackets which is entirely optional within the framework
of this model. However, there are other sections which should be
seriously considered by legislative drafters for addition to the above
statute. (1) A section might be drafted wherein if the objectionable
pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust of a pecuniary amount contains
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a charitable remainder, the "net appreciation-depreciation" technique
would be superimposed as opposed to the "no less than" technique,
thereby allowing for the deductibility of the charitable remainder.
Such a decision might be justifiably made by a legislative body which
feels that charitable remainders appear in the instruments of its resi-
dents an appreciable number of times. If this type of section is in-
cluded, it might provide that its provisions will be invoked only if the
amount of the charitable remainder constitutes a certain specified
percentage of the estate's assets or is in a certain specified ratio to
the amount of the potential marital deduction. (2) A section might
be added which, if the "no less than" technique were employed,
would specifically detail the limits within which the fiduciary may
exercise his discretion to distribute assets in excess of the "floor."
(3) Lastly, to avoid the possibility where a state's law was intended
to be, but was not, "clear" in terms of the Procedure and where an
objectionable pre-October 1, 1964, instrument was involved, a sec-
tion could be drafted for the purpose of clearly establishing the
requisite authority of the fiduciary to enter into the agreements neces-
sary for saving the marital deduction in such a case. Five states
have enacted such statutes: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-158.2 (1966);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-569 (Supp. 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-
1317 (Supp. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-71.2(c) (Supp. 1966);
W. VA. CODE § 44-5-12(c) (Supp. 1967).
[Vol. 46
